An Empirical Inquiry into the Use of Originalism: Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence During the Career of Justice Scalia by Rosenthal, Lawrence
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 70 | Issue 1 Article 3
1-2019
An Empirical Inquiry into the Use of Originalism:
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence During the
Career of Justice Scalia
Lawrence Rosenthal
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lawrence Rosenthal, An Empirical Inquiry into the Use of Originalism: Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence During the Career of Justice




An Empirical Inquiry into the Use of Originalism: 
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence During the 
Career of Justice Scalia 
LAWRENCE ROSENTHAL† 
There is likely no methodological question of greater importance to constitutional law than 
whether adjudication should be based on the original meaning of the Constitution’s text, or 
instead reflect an evolving understanding in light of felt experience. Little effort, however, has 
been made to test empirically the claim of originalists that their methodology offers an effective 
vehicle for constitutional adjudication. 
 
This study is the first to assess the extent to which original meaning, in practice, proves able to 
resolve constitutional litigation. To do so, it examines Fourth Amendment jurisprudence during 
the career of a self-proclaimed originalist, Justice Antonin Scalia. Cases involving the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures” were selected because stare 
decisis poses no apparent obstacle to the use of originalism in this area of constitutional law, 
and because the Fourth Amendment is typical of the kind of constitutional text likely to generate 
litigation. 
 
Originalism played a small role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence during the study period, 
with less than 14% of the opinions of the Court addressing a disputed question of Fourth 
Amendment law were originalist. Despite Justice Scalia’s professed commitment to originalism, 
he voted on originalist grounds in only 18.63% of cases. The Court’s other professed originalist, 
Justice Clarence Thomas, voted on originalist grounds in only 15.71% of cases. If anything, this 
study’s coding methodology likely overstates the prevalence of originalism. Voting patterns were 
not markedly different for Justices who do not profess fealty to originalism. These results 
seemingly reflect the difficulty in applying original meaning in contemporary constitutional 
adjudication, rather than a lack of commitment to originalism. This difficulty is likely 
generalizable to other areas of constitutional law, and casts doubt on the utility of originalism 
as an adjudicative methodology.  
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INTRODUCTION 
There is likely no methodological question of greater importance to 
constitutional law than the question of whether adjudication should be based on 
the original meaning of the Constitution’s text or, should instead reflect an 
understanding of the text’s meaning that evolves over time. 
Consider the Supreme Court’s decision recognizing a constitutional right 
of same-sex couples to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges.1 The opinion of the Court 
advanced a classic argument for an evolving understanding of constitutional 
law; after observing that “[t]he nature of injustice is that we may not always see 
it in our own times,” Justice Kennedy wrote:  
The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its 
dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the 
right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.2 
In his dissent, Justice Scalia offered a classic originalist response: “When 
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, every State limited marriage to 
one man and one woman, and no one doubted the constitutionality of doing so. 
That resolves these cases.”3 
The debate is a familiar one. Originalist objections have appeared in 
dissenting opinions in virtually every instance in recent decades in which the 
Court recognized constitutional rights unknown when the Constitution was 
framed.4 Originalist arguments, however, are not confined to dissenting 
opinions; they have often appeared in opinions of the Court rejecting efforts to 
expand the scope of constitutional rights beyond those that have been 
historically recognized.5 Conversely, on other occasions, originalism has been  
 
 
 1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2. Id. at 2598. This passage echoes what may be the paradigmatic statement of an evolving understanding 
of the Constitution: 
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United 
States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not 
have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize 
or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors 
much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in 
the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago. 
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). 
 3. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 4. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 595–98 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disputing 
recognition of a right to engage in private, same-sex sexual acts); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173–76 (1973) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (contesting the recognition of a right to abortion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
376–85 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (rejecting the claim that the death penalty violates the Constitution). 
 5. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1818–20 (2014) (rejecting the claim that the 
Establishment Clause prohibits legislative prayer); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722–28 (1997) 
(rejecting a claimed right to assisted suicide); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
194–97 (1989) (rejecting the claim that a child had a right to be protected from his abusive father). 
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employed to expand the scope of constitutional protections.6 
The case for originalism is familiar as well. Originalism is frequently 
defended on the ground that any legal text is properly understood based on its 
meaning when framed.7 Its advocates also argue that originalism appropriately 
constrains judicial power by confining constitutional adjudication to the legal 
meaning of text,8 and reflects the proper role of the judiciary by leaving the 
making of constitutional law to those who framed and ratified constitutional 
text.9 Moreover, originalism is said to lead to desirable outcomes by protecting 
legal commitments that reflect fundamental values.10 
Scientific theories gain acceptance when they generate hypotheses that are 
later tested and borne out; surely legal theories deserve testing as well.11 Yet, 
 
 6. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (invalidating an ordinance prohibiting 
the possession of handguns in the home and requiring handguns be locked when not being used); Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (invalidating under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause a rule of 
evidence permitting the use of out-of-court statements reflecting adequate indicia of reliability). 
 7. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 35–37 (2011); RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE 
LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 102–11 (rev. ed. 2014); GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL 
INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 67–90 (1992); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 160–212 
(1999); Hans W. Baade, “Original Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 
1001, 1103–07 (1991); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 550–59 (1994); Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the 
Interpretation of “This Constitution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1186–1259 (1987); Christopher R. Green, “This 
Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1607, 1641–57 (2009); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: 
Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 229–36 (1988); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1127–48 
(2003); Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1833–36 (1997); Michael 
W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral 
Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1278–87 (1997); Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to 
Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2056–62 (2006); Ronald D. Rotunda, Original 
Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507, 512–14 (1988); Saikrishna 
B. Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 541–45 (1998); Lawrence B. 
Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 38–42 (2011).  
 8. See BARNETT, supra note 7, at 111–15; MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW 
OR POLITICS? 31–38 (1994); WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 50–61; Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and 
Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 288–91 (1996); Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” 
the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1020–29 (1992); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The 
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989); Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 
105–06 (1989); Solum, supra note 7, at 42–44. 
 9. See BALKIN, supra note 7, at 54–56; ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143–60 (1990); WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 152–59; Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1121–26 (1998); Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, 
Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1440, 1444–46 (2007); Jonathan R. 
Macey, Originalism as an “Ism,” 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 307–08 (1996); Michael W. McConnell, 
Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1132–37 (1998); Stephen E. Sachs, 
Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 844–58 (2015). 
 10. See, e.g., JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL D. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 
62–99 (2013); Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 82–88 (2009). 
 11. Cf. Lawrence M. Friedman, Law Reviews and Legal Scholarship: Some Comments, 75 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 661, 668 (1998) (“In most fields, a theory has to be testable; it is a hypothesis, a prediction, and therefore 
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little effort has been made to test the hypotheses generated by originalism. After 
all, whether originalism produces its claimed virtues is ultimately an empirical 
question. If the case for originalism is sound, one should be able to demonstrate 
that originalism constrains judicial discretion by providing a basis in the 
demonstrable original meaning of constitutional text for resolving disputed 
questions of constitutional law in the broad range of cases that come before the 
courts. As one leading originalist scholar put it, original meaning has utility in 
constitutional adjudication “only to the extent that this meaning can be 
ascertained and applied to a case or controversy.”12 If, however, originalism 
yields no answer in most cases, resort to other modalities of adjudication is 
inescapable, and originalism’s ability to deliver on its asserted virtues would be 
compromised. 
Whether originalism produces its theorized virtues is hotly disputed. 
Nonoriginalists argue that the constitutional text most likely to generate 
litigation is framed at such a high level of generality that the original meaning 
of constitutional text offers little useful guidance.13 Even many originalist 
scholars acknowledge that the original meaning of constitutional text is 
sometimes vague or ambiguous, necessitating resort to what they characterize as 
nonoriginalist construction.14 Others, in contrast, reject the need for 
nonoriginalist construction contending instead that textual vagueness or 
ambiguity can be addressed through the same methods that were employed at 
the time constitutional text was originally framed.15 This claim, as well, 
generates a testable hypothesis—that original methods can resolve textual 
vagueness and ambiguity and thereby facilitate adjudication on originalist 
grounds even in the face of seemingly vague or ambiguous constitutional text.16 
 
 
subject to proof. When legal scholars use the word ‘theory,’ they seem to mean (most of the time) something 
they consider deep, original, and completely untestable.”). 
 12. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. 
COMMENT. 257, 263 (2005). 
 13. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 7–10, 18–19 (2010); LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL 
C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 31–64 (1991); Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New 
Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 725–27 (2011); Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the Originalism 
Debate, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 411, 432–33 (1998); Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-
Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 716–24 (2011); D.A. Jeremy Telman, Originalism: A Thing Worth 
Doing . . ., 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 539, 549–50, 566–67 (2016). 
 14. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 7, at 14, 31–32; BARNETT, supra note 7, at 120–31; WHITTINGTON, supra 
note 7, at 5–14; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 
467–72 (2013); Grégoire C. N. Webber, Originalism’s Constitution, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: 
THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 147, 173–76 (Grant Huscraft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). 
 15. See, e.g., MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10, at 116–53; Sachs, supra note 9, at 874–83. 
 16. Cf. ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH 118 (2018) (“Throughout the book, the authors claim that 
these original methods will reduce the vagueness and imprecision of much of the constitutional text, but nowhere 
do they show how that would work in practice. Their project suffers from the absence of applying theory to facts 
because simply alleging that originalist rules and methods will make the judicial case deciding function easier, 
without showing how that is true, makes their claim hard to evaluate.”). 
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There have been a handful of scholarly efforts to examine the use of 
originalism in constitutional adjudication.17 This small body of research, 
however, does not endeavor to determine how often judicial decisions, or the 
votes of individual judges, turn on original meaning. This study is the first to 
undertake that task, and thereby, to assess the extent to which originalism, in 
practice, proves able to constrain constitutional adjudication. To do so, this study 
examines Fourth Amendment jurisprudence during the career of self-proclaimed 
originalist Justice Antonin Scalia. Justice Scalia’s career lasted long enough to 
supply a large, but manageable, set of Fourth Amendment decisions; moreover, 
cases involving the constitutional prohibition on “unreasonable searches and 
seizures”18 were selected because stare decisis poses no apparent obstacle to the 
use of originalism in this area of constitutional adjudication.19 Fourth 
Amendment cases during Justice Scalia’s tenure on the Court, therefore, 
represent a good opportunity to test the hypothesis that originalism provides a 
workable methodology for constitutional adjudication, even when constitutional 
text is framed at a relatively high level of generality. 
Part I explicates the methodology of the present study, including its 
definition of originalism and approach to coding opinions. If anything, the 
coding methodology utilized in this study likely overstates the prevalence of 
originalism. Part II presents the results, which indicate that originalism played a 
small role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: less than 14% of the opinions 
of the Court during Justice Scalia’s service were originalist. A Justice’s 
methodological commitments made little apparent difference; despite Justice 
Scalia’s professed commitment to originalism, he voted on originalist grounds 
in only 18.63% of cases addressing disputed questions of Fourth Amendment 
law. The Court’s other professed originalist, Justice Clarence Thomas, voted on 
originalist grounds in only 15.71% of cases. Voting patterns were not markedly 
different for Justices with different methodological commitments. Part III 
analyzes these results and suggests that they reflect neither a lack of commitment 
to originalism nor the influence of nonoriginalist precedent, but instead the 
difficulties in applying original meaning in contemporary constitutional 
adjudication. Part IV considers alternatives to Justice Scalia’s approach to 
originalism that might increase the rate of originalist adjudication, and concludes 
that none are very promising. 
I.  METHODOLOGY 
There are formidable methodological issues in studying the role of 
originalism in constitutional adjudication: originalism must be defined, a 
suitable dataset must be identified, and an approach must be developed for  
 
 
 17. This research is summarized in Subpart I.C below. 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 19. The compatibility between Fourth Amendment originalism and stare decisis is explored in Subpart I.B 
below. 
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coding opinions. 
A. DEFINING ORIGINALISM 
Determining what qualifies as originalist constitutional adjudication is no 
easy matter. Some originalist scholars, for example, contend that the Framers’ 
intent should be the focus of constitutional interpretation.20 Others reject inquiry 
into authorial intentions, and instead, treat the manner in which the Framing-era 
public would have understood the text as binding.21 Still others focus on how a 
hypothetical reasonable person in the Framing era would have understood the 
text.22 This brief summary, however, considerably understates the diversity of 
thinking among originalists; Thomas Colby and Peter Smith’s survey of 
originalist methodology, for example, identified a dizzying array of 
approaches.23 
Nevertheless, there are some conceptual commonalities in the various 
originalist methodologies. Lawrence Solum has written:  
Contemporary originalism is . . . united by two core ideas, fixation and constraint. 
The Fixation Thesis claims the original meaning (“communicative content”) of 
the constitutional text is fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified. 
The Constraint Principle claims that constitutional actors (e.g., judges, officials, 
and citizens) ought to be constrained by the original meaning when they engage 
in constitutional practice (paradigmatically deciding constitutional cases).24 
Professor Solum’s account nicely sketches the boundaries of originalism: 
absent fixation (like Professor Solum, I use the phrase “original meaning” to 
denote fixation) and constraint, the legal meaning of the Constitution is capable 
of evolution. Indeed, this account seems consistent with the views of virtually 
all originalists, who consistently endorse some version of fixation and 
constraint.25 
 
 20. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 540–42 
(2013); Kay, supra note 7, at 229–36; Steven D. Smith, Reply to Koppelman: Originalism and the (Merely) 
Human Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 189, 194–99 (2010). 
 21. See BORK, supra note 9, at 144–51; Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 
405, 410–16 (2007); Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 663, 668–72 (2009); Aileen Kavanagh, Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 255, 271–79 (2002); Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 
18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 411–15 (2009); Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge of Change”: 
Abduced-Principle Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates 
Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 972–80 (2009).  
 22. See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 
51–70 (2006). 
 23. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 247–62 (2009).  
 24. Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2015) (footnotes omitted). 
 25. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 78 (2012) (“Words must be given the meaning they had when the text was adopted.”); Keith E. 
Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2004) (“Originalism regards the 
discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of 
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There is one possible dissent to this account. William Baude has argued for 
an “inclusive originalism,” which, although it treats “the original meaning of the 
Constitution as the ultimate criterion for constitutional law,” also permits 
consideration of “precedent, policy, or practice, but only to the extent that the 
original meaning incorporates or permits them.”26 Professor Baude claims that 
virtually all constitutional jurisprudence is originalist in this sense, writing that 
“the Court never contradicts originalism. Indeed, the canonical cases that are 
most frequently invoked as examples of anti-originalism are actually 
reconcilable with originalism.”27 
Critics have charged that this account of inclusive originalism is so 
inclusive as to make originalism virtually meaningless.28 Yet, Professor Baude’s 
qualification that nonoriginalist considerations are appropriate when permitted 
by original meaning crucially limits his claim. Professor Baude acknowledges 
that nonoriginalist methods of construction are inescapable when the 
Constitution’s original meaning is vague or ambiguous, and that nonoriginalist 
precedent is binding to the extent that the original meaning of the Constitution 
was thought to embrace reliance on precedent.29 Accordingly, Professor Baude’s 
position does not differ from that of other originalists who argue that 
nonoriginalist construction is sometimes necessary.30 
To the extent, however, that Professor Baude treats decisions as originalist 
merely because they do not purport to reject original meaning, his approach is 
problematic. A claim that decisions of the Supreme Court do not depart from the 
original meaning of the Constitution, after all, is quite different from a claim that 
these decisions rest on the original meaning of constitutional text fixed at the 
time of framing and ratification. If, for example, the original meaning of 
constitutional text is vague or ambiguous as applied to most cases, then original 




constitutional interpretation in the present.”). Stephen Sachs has offered a qualification, arguing that originalism 
requires only a commitment to legal rules fixed in the past, even if not contained in a written text. Stephen E. 
Sachs, Originalism Without Text, 127 YALE L.J. 156, 157–59 (2017). For present purposes, the case for non-
textual originalism is immaterial because this study focuses on the original meaning of text—the Fourth 
Amendment. As we will see, however, Fourth Amendment originalism often includes a commitment to framing-
era legal practice not necessarily reflected in the Fourth Amendment’s text, and therefore this Article’s 
methodology is consistent with Professor Sachs’s view of originalism. 
 26. William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2355, 2356–63 (2015). 
 27. Id. at 2371; see also William Baude, Adam S. Chilton, and Anup Malani, Making Doctrinal Work More 
Rigorous: Lessons from Systematic Reviews, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 55–57 (2017) (undertaking a systematic 
review of Supreme Court opinions and finding them “consistent with” inclusive originalism as defined by 
Baude). But cf. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, 20 GREEN BAG 2D 103, 107–08 (2016) 
(opining that a substantial body of constitutional doctrine may be incompatible with originalism).  
 28. See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL READINGS AND 
AGAINST ORIGINALISMS 15–19 (2015); SEGALL, supra note 16, at 104–15; Jamal Greene, Rule Originalism, 116 
COLUM. L. REV. 1639, 1657–58 (2016); Richard A. Posner, What Is Obviously Wrong with the Federal 
Judiciary, Yet Eminently Curable, Part II, 19 GREEN BAG 2d 257, 264 n.12 (2016). 
 29. Baude, supra note 26, at 2357–61. 
 30. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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inescapable. 
Consider Professor Baude’s claim that the holding in Brown v. Board of 
Education31—that racial segregation in public education violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment—can be reconciled with original meaning.32 Perhaps this is so, but 
the Brown opinion states that the historical evidence before the Court regarding 
“the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,” 
including evidence relating to the “exhaustive[] consideration of the 
Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing practices in 
racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the 
Amendment,” were nevertheless “not enough to resolve the problem with which 
we are faced,” being “[a]t best . . . inconclusive.”33 In light of this express denial 
that its decision rested on the historical evidence of original meaning, surely 
Brown cannot be characterized as a decision reflecting no more than fixation and 
constraint. That a decision may be “reconcilable” with originalism does not 
establish that historical evidence of the original meaning of constitutional text 
played any meaningful role in producing it. Especially when the original 
meaning of constitutional text is framed at a high level of generality, a great 
many holdings may be reconcilable with originalism, but some other 
adjudicative modality is nevertheless required to pick among them.34 
Accordingly, one cannot treat an opinion as originalist when it makes no 
claim to rest on the meaning of the Constitution as fixed at the framing, at least 
if one wishes to determine as an empirical matter the frequency at which 
originalism produces outcomes in constitutional adjudication. Therefore, 
Professor Baude’s account of inclusive originalism cannot address the empirical 
question of concern here. To determine the rate at which originalism produces 
answers to disputed questions of constitutional law that come before the courts, 
inquiry is required into whether a judicial resolution of a disputed question of  
 
 
 31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 32. See Baude, supra note 26, at 2380–81 (“Brown spends several pages at the very beginning of the 
opinion fighting the original-meaning question to a draw” and accordingly “nothing in Brown’s official 
canonicity contradicts originalism’s legal status.”). 
 33. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489. For what is likely the leading originalist defense of Brown that relies primarily 
on the substantial support for efforts to end segregation during Reconstruction, see Michael W. McConnell, 
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995). For a powerful response that, among 
other things, notes that legally-imposed racial segregation remained common, even in the North, after the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional 
Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995). If the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
original meaning forbade governmentally-imposed racial segregation, it is surely odd that the Fourteenth 
Amendment had so little demonstrable impact on the prevalence of segregation during the period in which its 
original meaning should have been apparent throughout the nation that had just ratified the Amendment. 
 34. Cf. Louis Michael Seidman, This Essay Is Brilliant/This Essay Is Stupid: Positive and Negative Self-
Reference in Constitutional Practice and Theory, 46 UCLA L. REV. 501, 550 (1998) (“If originalism never 
requires judges to reach results that they would not reach using some other theory, it does no independent work 
and can be reduced to the rival theory that is in fact determining outcomes.”). 
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law reflects fixation and constraint. 
B. THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
To assess the extent to which originalism is used as the basis for 
constitutional adjudication, this study focuses on Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence during Justice Scalia’s career on the United States Supreme Court. 
Throughout that time, Justice Scalia professed adherence to the original meaning 
of the Constitution as the basis for constitutional adjudication.35 Justice Scalia 
embraced originalism as defined above; he described originalism as an example 
of what he called the “Fixed Meaning Canon.”36 Accordingly, Justice Scalia’s 
career presents an opportunity to study the jurisprudence of a committed 
originalist. 
1. Originalism and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence  
A study of originalist adjudication may be confounded by the doctrine of 
stare decisis. Although some originalist scholars argue that originalism requires 
repudiation of nonoriginalist precedent,37 others believe that at least some types 
of nonoriginalist precedent deserve deference.38 Justice Scalia was (mostly) in 
the latter camp: in his extrajudicial writings, he expressed reluctance to repudiate 
nonoriginalist precedent,39 although there were occasions on which he did so.40 
 
 35. See, e.g., Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2184 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (opinion of the Court delivered by Scalia, J.); Minnesota v. Dickerson 508 
U.S. 366, 379–80 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962–85 (1991) (opinion 
of Scalia, J.); see also Antonin Scalia, Foreword, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 871, 871 (2008) (“Twenty years 
ago, when I joined the Supreme Court, I was the only originalist among its numbers.”). 
 36. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 25, at 78–92. To similar effect, see Scalia, supra note 8, at 862–64. 
 37. See Barnett, supra note 12, at 262–69; Steven G. Calabresi, Text vs. Precedent in Constitutional Law, 
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 947, 948–51 (2008); Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against 
Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 13–22 (2007); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically 
Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 298 (2005). 
 38. See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 10, at 154–74 (arguing that the original meaning of the 
Constitution contemplates that federal courts will employ a doctrine of precedent); Baude, supra note 26, at 
2358–61 (same); Randy J. Kozel, Original Meaning and the Precedent Fallback, 68 VAND. L. REV. 105, 121–
47 (2015) (arguing that precedent can be used in the face of uncertainty about original meaning); Lash, supra 
note 9, at 1444–61 (arguing for deference to precedents that enhance popular sovereignty); Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 739–72 (1988) (arguing that 
some precedents are too entrenched in constitutional adjudication to be repudiated); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis 
and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 5–50 (2001) (arguing that reliance on precedent as 
a method of addressing legal indeterminacy is rooted in Framing-era understandings); Lee J. Strang, An 
Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. 
REV. 419, 436–79 (2006) (arguing that nonoriginalist precedent should be preserved if its repudiation would 
produce serious costs). 
 39. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 25, at 87, 411–14; Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 129–40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 40. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 556–65 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (refusing to apply 
precedents regarding congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment outside the context of racial 
discrimination); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60–68 (2004) (overruling Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 
(1980)); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 447–50, 461–65 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advocating 
that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) be overruled); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
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One could speculate that, at least in some cases, Justice Scalia may have failed 
to employ originalism in his jurisprudence out of deference to nonoriginalist 
precedent.41 
To avoid this problem, this study examines Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. In this area, there is good reason to believe that stare decisis posed 
no obstacle to originalist adjudication. In fact, originalism has deep roots in 
Fourth Amendment precedent. 
As early as Boyd v. United States,42 “the first Fourth Amendment case of 
real consequence,”43 the Court wrote that “to ascertain the nature of the 
proceedings intended by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution under the 
terms ‘unreasonable searches and seizures,’” it was necessary to consider the 
Framing-era “history of the controversies on the subject, both in this country and 
in England.”44 The Court then held that an order directing an importer to produce 
records relating to a shipment that had been seized for forfeiture was inconsistent 
with the Framing-era rule forbidding a search of private papers except when 
authorized by a valid warrant.45 Subsequently, in the landmark decision of 
Carroll v. United States,46 the Court, citing Boyd, wrote: “The Fourth 




833, 996–1001 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (advocating that Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) be overruled). 
 41. Some regarded Justice Scalia’s willingness to adhere to nonoriginalist precedent, as well as his 
skepticism about enforcing constitutional text that does not yield clear and readily administrable rules or that 
generates what seem to be perverse results, as important deviations from originalism. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, 
Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 10–14 (2006). We will 
see, however, that nonoriginalist precedent and the absence of readily-administrable rules posed little apparent 
obstacle to originalism in Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. As for problematic results, Justice 
Scalia once acknowledged: “[I]n a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot imagine myself, any 
more than any other federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging. But then I cannot 
imagine such a case’s arising either.” Scalia, supra note 8, at 864. Not only does this passage make clear that 
Justice Scalia did not regard it as likely that he would confront a case in which originalism produced an extreme 
result, but we will also see that there is no evident example of this problem infecting his Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. It is worth noting that Justice Scalia eventually repudiated his self-characterization as a “faint-
hearted originalist,” claiming that he adhered to originalism regardless of consequences. See Jennifer Senior, In 
Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 6, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/ features/antonin-scalia-2013-
10. 
 42. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 43. JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 49 (1966). 
 44. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624–25. 
 45. Id. at 625–30. 
 46. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). For a helpful discussion of the importance of Carroll to the subsequent 
development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth? The 
Framers Preserved Common-Law Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—“Fourth 
Amendment Reasonableness” Is Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 51, 121–28 
(2010). 
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search and seizure when it was adopted . . . .”47 The Court then undertook an 
analysis of the law governing customs searches of ships and their cargo in the 
wake of the Fourth Amendment’s framing, and concluded that a warrantless 
search of an automobile based on probable cause to believe it contained 
contraband was consistent with the original understanding of search and seizure 
authority.48 Three years later, in Olmstead v. United States,49 the Court, after 
observing that “[t]he well known historical purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment . . . was to prevent the use of governmental force to search a man’s 
house, his person, his papers, and his effects; and to prevent their seizure against 
his will,”50 held that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated by wiretapping 
undertaken to intercept telephonic conversations absent “actual physical 
invasion of [a] house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure.”51 
Thus, originalism has long been employed in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. To be sure, by the 1960s, the Court was less hospitable to Fourth 
Amendment originalism. For example, in Katz v. United States,52 making no 
reference to any historical evidence of the original meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court repudiated Olmstead and held that warrantless 
wiretapping of a telephone booth violated the Fourth Amendment, reasoning: 
“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, 
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve 
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”53 The next Term, in Terry v. Ohio, the Court rejected the view that 
“the authority of the police must be strictly circumscribed by the law of arrest 
and search as it has developed to date in the traditional jurisprudence of 
the Fourth Amendment,” 54 and concluded that the constitutional reasonableness 
of a contested search or seizure should be assessed by “balancing the need to 
search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.”55 On 
that basis, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment permitted the brief 
detention and frisk of a suspect for weapons based on reasonable suspicion, 
rather than the traditional standard of probable cause.56 
Nevertheless, originalism did not disappear from Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. In United States v. Watson,57 the Court relied on the prevailing 
common-law rule in the Framing era to hold that warrantless arrests in public 
places based on probable cause to believe that the arrestee had committed an 
 
 47. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149. 
 48. Id. at 149–53. 
 49. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 50. Id. at 463. 
 51. Id. at 466. 
 52. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 53. Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted). 
 54. 392 U.S. 1, 11 (1968). 
 55. Id. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967)).  
 56. Id. at 27. 
 57. 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
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offense are consistent with the Fourth Amendment.58 In Oliver v. United 
States,59 the Court concluded that nothing in Katz’s privacy-based approach 
required abandonment of the rule that the protection of the Fourth Amendment 
“is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the 
house is as old as the common law.”60 The Court reasoned that “the common 
law implies, as we reaffirm today, that no expectation of privacy legitimately 
attaches to open fields.”61 In this fashion, the Court reconciled its doctrinal 
innovation in Katz with Framing-era understandings about the reach of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
The effort to reconcile originalism with Katz became even more apparent 
in Kyllo v. United States.62 When considering whether the use of a thermal 
imaging device to locate the sources of heat in a home was an unreasonable 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Scalia wrote the 
opinion of the Court, which, while acknowledging that the Court’s “Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass,” added: “It would 
be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth 
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”63 
Accordingly, he reasoned: 
[T]here is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal 
expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable. To 
withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to permit police 
technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. . . . This 
assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed 
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.64 
Kyllo is hardly the only example of the persistence of Fourth Amendment 
originalism. For instance, in Wilson v. Arkansas, in the course of holding that 
the common-law requirement that an officer knock and announce his authority 
before making a forcible entry to execute a warrant was an aspect of reasonable 
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the Court wrote that to identify 
Fourth Amendment protections, “[W]e have looked to the traditional protections 
against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the common law at the 
time of the framing.”65 Subsequently, Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the 
Court in Wyoming v. Houghton,66 in which he echoed Wilson’s originalist 
methodology: “In determining whether a particular governmental action violates  
 
 
 58. Id. at 418–24. 
 59. 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
 60. Id. at 176 (quoting Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924)). 
 61. Id. at 180. 
 62. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 63. Id. at 31, 33–34. 
 64. Id. at 34 (citation omitted). 
 65. 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) (citations omitted). 
 66. 526 U.S. 295 (1999). 
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the [Fourth Amendment], we inquire first whether the action was regarded as an 
unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was 
framed.”67 
Thus, the evidence suggests that the force of precedent posed no apparent 
obstacle to the use of originalism in Fourth Amendment adjudication.68 
2. Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment Originalism 
Houghton provides a useful illustration of Justice Scalia’s Fourth 
Amendment originalism. Justice Scalia never claimed that the semantic meaning 
of the terms “search” or “seizure” had changed since the Framing-era. On the 
occasions in which he discussed the original meaning of those terms, Justice 
Scalia utilized definitions consistent with contemporary parlance.69 In this sense, 
the Fourth Amendment may be typical of the Constitution’s text, as John 
Harrison observed: “Reading the Constitution or the Federalist Papers or 
accounts of debates from the 1790s is not like reading Chaucer or even 
Shakespeare. Madison did not live in our time, but he did speak our language.”70 
 
 67. Id. at 299.  
 68. Cf. Joshua B. Fischman & Tonja Jacobi, The Second Dimension of the Supreme Court, 57 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1671, 1699–1713 (2015) (identifying Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as an area in which 
typical voting alignments on the Supreme Court tend not to hold and suggesting that Justices’ varying 
methodological commitments to “legalism” or “pragmatism” explains this pattern). 
 69. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32 n.1 (2001) (“When the Fourth Amendment was adopted, as now, to 
‘search’ meant ‘[t]o look over or through for the purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine by 
inspection; as, to search the house for a book; to search the wood for a thief.’” (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AN 
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 66 (1828) (reprint 6th ed. 1989)); California v. Hodari D., 
499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (“From the time of the founding to the present, the word ‘seizure’ has meant a ‘taking 
possession,’ . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 70. John Harrison, Forms of Originalism and the Study of History, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 94 
(2003). In this respect, it is illuminating to consider the examples of “linguistic drift” in the meaning of 
constitutional terms since the Framing era offered by Professor Solum, who has advanced what is likely the most 
fully theorized account of originalism. First, he observed that the constitutional obligation of the United States 
to “protect” the states “against domestic violence,” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 4, reflects an evolution in 
meaning since the phrase “domestic violence” has acquired a new meaning unknown during the framing era. 
Solum, supra note 24, at 16–17. Yet, as nonoriginalist scholars have observed, most contemporary readers of 
the Constitution would grasp from its context that the Constitution’s reference to “domestic violence” connotes 
civil unrest and not violence between intimates. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 2011, 2044 (2012) (reviewing BALKIN, supra note 7 & STRAUSS, supra note 13); Martin H. Redish & 
Matthew B. Arnold, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a 
“Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1529–30 (2012). Second, Professor Solum suggested 
that the constitutional prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments,” U.S. CONST. amend VIII, might have 
been understood in the Framing era to refer not to punishments that are rarely employed as in contemporary 
parlance, but instead as “a term of art that referred to governmental practices that are contrary to ‘long usage’ or 
‘immemorial usage.’” Solum, supra note 24, at 74 (quoting John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of 
“Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1745 (2008)). It is 
unclear, however, if this establishes linguistic drift, or merely textual ambiguity. Contemporary, no less than 
Framing-era, speakers might use the phrase “cruel and unusual punishments” to connote punishments regarded 
as archaic, even if they might also use it to refer to punishments that are rarely administered. It is, moreover, 
doubtful that the Framing-era understanding was free from ambiguity; the only discussion of the phrase on the 
floor of the House of Representatives as it considered what became the Eighth Amendment came from two 
representatives who complained that the proposal was vague, and might prohibit then-common punishments, 
including hanging. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 261 n.3, 261–64 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); cf. 16 
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Nor did Justice Scalia attempt to illuminate original meaning by reference to the 
history of the drafting and ratification of the Fourth Amendment, perhaps 
because that history contains little discussion aside from expressions of concern 
about general warrants unsupported by any particularized showing or 
authorization.71 
Instead, as in Houghton, Justice Scalia relied primarily on Framing-era 
practice to illustrate the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.72 Justice 
Scalia believed there was good reason to consult Framing-era practice in order 
to ascertain original meaning, even for constitutional text that is framed in 
“abstract and general rather than specific and concrete” terms, since “[t]he 
context suggests that the abstract and general terms, like the concrete and 
particular ones, are meant to nail down current rights, rather than aspire after 
future ones—that they are abstract and general references to extant rights and 
freedoms possessed under the then-current regime.”73 He later added that the 
Constitution “employ[ed] general terms such as due process, equal protection, 
[and] cruel and unusual punishments. What these generalities meant as applied 
to many phenomena that existed at the time of their adoption was well 
understood and accepted.”74 
By using historical evidence of the Framing-era understanding of lawful 
search or seizure, Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment originalism utilized 
contextual evidence to identify the meaning of the unreasonable searches and 
seizures as fixed in the Framing era, rather than assessing reasonableness by 
reference to contemporary understandings. In this sense, Justice Scalia’s Fourth 
Amendment originalism differed from nonoriginalist textualism; he read the 
Fourth Amendment through the lens of historical context, rather than utilizing 
its contemporary meaning. This approach is no outlier; there is widespread 
agreement among originalists that original meaning is illuminated by contextual 
evidence of the Framing-era understanding.75 Many originalist scholars have 
 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 379, 381 (John P. Kaminiski & Gaspare 
J. Saladino eds., 1986) (“The expressions ‘unusual and severe,’ or ‘cruel and unusual,’ surely would have been 
too vague to have been of any consequence, since they admit of no clear and precise signification.”). In any 
event, even if there has been linguistic drift with respect to some terms found in this Constitution, Professor 
Solum has not endeavored to demonstrate that this is a common phenomenon in constitutional interpretation. 
 71. For a helpful account of the drafting and ratification history, see WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING, 602–1791, at 691–98, 712–23 (2009). 
 72. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008) (“We look to the statutes and common law of 
the founding era to determine the norms that the Fourth Amendment was meant to preserve.”). 
 73. Scalia, supra note 39, at 135. 
 74. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 25, at 85. 
 75. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 414 
(2013) (“[T]o ascertain the original public meaning of the text, the New Originalism looks to the publicly 
available communicative context of these words to resolve problems of ambiguity.”); Kay, supra note 7, at 241 
(“[L]anguage [i]s part of the means employed by individuals to accomplish their objectives. Our job in trying to 
understand language is to discern those objectives. We can accomplish this only by participating in, or 
investigating, the system of conventions people use in a given time and place and by considering the likelihood 
of various objectives in light of the particular circumstances in which language is used—that is, by considering 
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also argued that Framing-era practice provides important contextual evidence 
that helpfully fleshes out the original meaning of constitutional text.76 Others 
have added that emerging computer-assisted techniques involving “corpus 
linguistics” facilitate inquiry into original meaning by enabling Framing-era 
linguistic datasets to be analyzed to determine the manner and context in which 
constitutional text was most often employed.77 
Although Justice Scalia never discussed the original meaning of the term 
“unreasonable” in the Fourth Amendment, there is reason to believe that its 
original meaning offers support for his focus on Framing-era practice and usage 
when undertaking Fourth Amendment originalism. While David Sklansky’s 
review of the historical evidence convinced him that in the Framing era, the 
term “unreasonable” meant “what it means today: contrary to sound judgment, 




the ‘context’ of the particular utterance.” (footnote omitted)); H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. 
L. REV. 659, 674 (1987) (“[T]o translate the founders’ thought we need to do more than construct a lexicon of 
late eighteenth- or mid-nineteenth-century political terms. We must also locate the cultural context that gave 
their constitutional views meaning and urgency.”); Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 875 
(1992) (“[T]he federal constitution should be interpreted in accordance with originalist textualism, understood 
as a method which searches for the ordinary public meanings that the Constitution’s words, read in linguistic, 
structural, and historical context, had at the time of those words’ origin.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist 
Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 285 (2017) (“Bare semantic meanings are sparse. Lawyers are very 
familiar with the idea that the literal meaning of a text does not deliver the full contextual meaning. This point 
is related to the notion that the semantic content of a constitutional provision may underdetermine its legal 
effect . . . . Some of this underdeterminacy may be resolved by context . . . .”); Keith E. Whittington, Dworkin’s 
“Originalism”: The Role of Intentions in Constitutional Interpretation, 62 REV. POL. 197, 212 (2000) 
(“[H]istorical material is ‘not merely relevant to,’ but is required by the search for textual meaning. One cannot 
accurately interpret my descriptive statement, ‘the children are playing,’ if one does not also realize that ‘the 
children’ refers to my pet dogs. Likewise, one cannot understand the requirements of the due process clause, or 
recognize that the equal protection clause does not require wealth redistribution, without understanding the 
historical context and background of the clause, even if it does not amount to a legal term of art.”).  
 76. See Kay, supra note 7, at 253; Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—and Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1627, 1654–55 (1997); John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the 
Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 378–81 (2007); Smith, supra note 20, at 194–99; Strang, supra 
note 21, at 964–73; John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of 
War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 172–74 (1996); cf. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive 
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525–39 (2003) (arguing that post-enactment practice can shed important 
light on original meaning). 
 77. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 75, at 284 (“The evidence provided by corpus linguistics is primary 
evidence of the patterns of usage themselves, whereas dictionary definitions and linguistic intuitions are 
secondary evidence. Corpus linguistics enables the use of quantitative methods and hence minimizes the role of 
subjective, qualitative judgments.”); Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can Increase Originalism’s Methodological 
Rigor: Using Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181, 1205 
(2017) (“The originalist will identify and catalogue uses of the term uncovered by CART [computer-assisted 
research techniques], and then, from the text’s immediate context, ascertain the language convention (if any) 
employed.”). 
 78. David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1780 
(2000). To similar effect, see DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 160–61 
(2017). 
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contexts, the term meant “going outside the boundaries of a settled rule,”79 and 
Thomas Davies concluded that it “meant searches and seizures that were 
inherently illegal at common law.”80 These latter definitions suggest that the 
Fourth Amendment’s original meaning is hospitable to Justice Scalia’s 
approach; the prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures” may well 
have incorporated prevailing legal understandings about the lawful reach of 
governmental search and seizure authority.81 
Application of Framing-era search and seizure to contemporary search and 
seizure litigation, however, can pose difficulties. Scholars frequently argue that 
when the context in which Framing-era doctrine developed has changed, 
continued application of Framing-era rules may become problematic.82 For 
example, although the Court correctly noted in Olmstead that in the Framing era, 
the Fourth Amendment regulated only “an actual physical invasion . . . for the 
purpose of making a seizure,”83 in the Framing-era there was little ability for the 
government to intrude upon the privacy of the home absent a physical invasion. 
For this reason, application of the Framing-era rule to modern methods of 
electronic surveillance could well prove unfaithful to the Framing-era 
conception of the Fourth Amendment as a limitation on the government’s 
investigative authority.84 
Justice Scalia was sensitive to this problem. He cautioned that 
constitutional interpretation should be based on “semantic intention” and not 
“the concrete expectations of lawgivers.”85 In this sense, he echoed the views of 
most originalist scholars, who argue that only the original meaning of 
constitutional text, and not the manner in which that text was to be applied in 
the Framing era, should be regarded as binding.86 Kyllo provides a good 
 
 79. Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1275 (2016) (emphasis 
removed). 
 80. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 693 (1999). 
 81. Cf. William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. 
L. REV. 1821, 1827–41 (2016) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment’s Framing-era history suggests concern with 
protecting extant legal rights regarding search and seizure). 
 82. See BALKIN, supra note 7, at 10–16, 75–81; RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL 
READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 291–94 (1996); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and 
Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1804–10 (1997); Mark 
D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569, 591–617 (1998); Stephen 
M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1205–08; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in 
Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1169–71 (1993). 
 83. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
 84. For a helpful discussion of this point that touches on wiretapping, see Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and 
Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1367–79 (1997). 
 85. Scalia, supra note 39, at 144. 
 86. See BALKIN, supra note 7, at 6–14; Barnett, supra note 21, at 410; Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism 
and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 385–89 (2007); 
Calabresi & Fine, supra note 21, at 668–72; Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference 
Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 580–82 (2006); McConnell, supra note 7, at 1284–87; Paulsen, supra note 
7, at 2059–62; James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. 
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example. In that case, as we have seen, Justice Scalia rejected the Framing-era 
understanding that search and seizure involved some form of physical intrusion 
in favor of what he regarded as an underlying Framing-era baseline protection 
of privacy embedded within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.87 
“The purpose of the [Fourth Amendment],” he wrote in another case, “is to 
preserve that degree of respect for the privacy of persons and the inviolability of 
their property that existed when the provision was adopted—even if a later, less 
virtuous age should become accustomed to considering all sorts of intrusion 
‘reasonable.’”88 
Justice Scalia’s sensitivity to changes in context was not confined to 
technological advances, it included attention to other contextual evidence that 
might render reliance on Framing-era rules suspect. For example, in Georgia v. 
Randolph,89 Justice Scalia, in his separate opinion responding to the claim that 
under the Framing-era law of property a wife had no legal right to authorize a 
search of property owned by her husband, wrote: 
There is nothing new or surprising in the proposition that our unchanging 
Constitution refers to other bodies of law that might themselves change. . . . No 
one supposes that the meaning of the Constitution changes as States expand and 
contract property rights. If it is indeed true, therefore, that a wife in 1791 could 
not authorize the search of her husband’s house, the fact that current property law 
provides otherwise is no more troublesome for the originalist than the well-
established fact that a State must compensate its takings of even those property 
rights that did not exist at the time of the founding.90 
Thus, Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is sensitive to altered 
historical contexts. 
In sum, given the scope and sophistication of Justice Scalia’s Fourth 
Amendment originalism, and the lack of any apparent precedential obstacle to 
the use of originalism in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Scalia’s 
work in this area provides an excellent opportunity to examine the behavior of a 
committed originalist jurist, and contrast his record to that of other members of 





REV. 1523, 1539–46 (2011); Solum, supra note 24, at 48–55. 
 87. See supra text accompanying notes 62–64. 
 88. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 89. 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
 90. Id. at 144 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 91. For a largely favorable assessment of Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment originalism, see Timothy C. 
MacDonnell, Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment: Text, Context, Clarity, and Occasional Faint-Hearted 
Originalism, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 175 (2015). For more critical assessments, see Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, 
The Contingent Fourth Amendment, 64 EMORY L.J. 1229, 1235–45 (2015); M. Blane Michael, Reading the 
Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief that Gave It Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 912–19 (2010); and 
Sklansky, supra note 78, at 1775–813. 
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C. CODING OPINIONS 
Developing a method to code opinions as either originalist or nonoriginalist 
presents difficulties. As Frank Cross, who undertook what is likely the most 
comprehensive effort to date to measure the prevalence of originalism in the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, observed, “Originalism is difficult to measure. 
In theory, one might read every opinion of the Court and assess its fealty to the 
originalist method. This approach is unrealistically difficult, though, and would 
also suffer from the subjective biases of the assessor.”92 
Presumably to avoid the potential for subjectivity in coding, most scholars 
who have endeavored to measure the prevalence of originalism have used 
references to historical evidence of original meaning in judicial opinions as a 
proxy for originalism. Professor Cross, for example, coded opinions that refer to 
The Federalist, the materials on the ratification of the original Constitution in 
Elliot’s Debates, the Farrand compilation of Madison’s notes on the 
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, Framing-era dictionaries, and the 
Declaration of Independence as originalist.93 Others who have attempted to 
measure the prevalence of originalism have used a similar approach.94 These 
studies have consistently found that the use of originalist evidence did not 
predict the manner in which Members of the Court voted, suggesting that 
originalism is largely used as a pretext to mask ideological preferences.95 
This approach avoids the dangers of subjectivity, but it has a critical 
weakness; it does not assess the extent to which a Justice’s vote rested on 
whatever evidence of original meaning may be referenced in an opinion. 
Professor Cross, for example, concluded that his study showed that “originalist 
sources are simply used to ‘decorate’ opinions reached on other grounds.”96 Yet, 
judicial insincerity is not the only conceivable explanation for studies that find 
that the use of originalist evidence does not predict Justices’ votes. A  
 
 
 92. FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 120 (2013). 
 93. Id. at 120–25. 
 94. See, e.g., Pamela C. Corley et al., The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Use of the Federalist 
Papers, 58 POL. RES. Q. 329, 329–33 (2005) (surveying court citations to the Federalist Papers); Mathew J. 
Festa, Dueling Federalists: Supreme Court Decisions with Multiple Opinions Citing The Federalist, 1986–2007, 
31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 75, 93–95 (2007) (same); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at 
Originalism, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 113, 121–26 (2002) (reviewing parties’ briefs and identifying claims based 
on the intent of the Framers); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Convention, 27 J.L. 
& POL. 63, 70–71 (2011) (identifying references to the Constitutional Convention in opinions and briefs); Peter 
J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA 
L. REV. 217, 251–56 (2004) (identifying statements of Framing-era views on federalism in opinions addressing 
federalism issues). 
 95. See, e.g., CROSS, supra note 92, at 173–89; Festa, supra note 94, at 99–103; Howard & Segal, supra 
note 94, at 126–34; Smith, supra note 94, at 256–86; see also Corley et al., supra note 94, at 335–38 (finding 
that citations to The Federalist Papers are driven by both attitudinal and tactical considerations); cf. Sirico, supra 
note 94, at 76–77 (finding that ideology did not predict a Justice’s references to the Constitutional Convention). 
 96. CROSS, supra note 92, at 188. 
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methodology that asks only whether an opinion refers to historical evidence of 
original meaning may improperly code as originalist opinions that ultimately 
conclude that historical evidence of original meaning does not supply a basis to 
decide the cases, just as Brown concluded that the evidence of the Framing-era 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment did not supply a basis for decision in 
that case. A coding methodology that more rigorously assesses whether 
originalism drives judicial decision-making better gauges the impact of 
originalism on judicial decision-making, and for that reason could unearth 
meaningful differences in the jurisprudence of individual Justices related to their 
use of originalism. 
Consider Payton v. New York.97 In that case, the Court held that absent 
exigent circumstances, a warrant must issue before the authorities can make a 
forcible entry to arrest an individual in his residence.98 The Court engaged in a 
lengthy discussion of the Framing-era law of arrest before concluding that “the 
issue is not one that can be said to have been definitively settled by the common 
law at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”99 Justice White’s 
dissenting opinion, in contrast, relied heavily on the Framing-era law of arrest, 
using it as the basis for his conclusion that the Fourth Amendment requires no 
warrant to make a forcible entry to the arrestee’s home to effect an arrest for a 
felony.100 A methodology that codes both opinions as originalist because both 
discuss historical evidence of original meaning would ignore the critical 
difference between the opinions. Justice White’s opinion uses historical 
evidence of original meaning to decide the case, while the opinion of the Court 
does not. Under the definition of originalism advanced above, only Justice 
White’s dissenting opinion in Payton qualifies as originalist. 
Accordingly, coding opinions as originalist merely because they reference 
historical evidence of original meaning overlooks the reality that sometimes an 
opinion may consult evidence of original meaning, and yet, as in Brown, find it 
inadequate to decide the case before the Court.101 To assess the extent to which 
originalism drives Fourth Amendment law, there is no substitute for reading 
opinions and identifying the claims that they make about original meaning. This 
represents no radical innovation in empirical legal scholarship; a standard social 
science technique—“content analysis”—has been increasingly used in empirical 
legal scholarship to analyze judicial opinions.102 This study is the first to employ 
methods of content analysis to assess the prevalence of originalism in Supreme  
 
 
 97. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
 98. Id. at 586–90. 
 99. Id. at 598. 
 100. Id. at 604–15 (White, J., dissenting). 
 101. Cf. Melvyn R. Durchslag, The Supreme Court and the Federalist Papers: Is There Less Here than 
Meets the Eye?, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 243, 312–15 (2005) (concluding from a review of the pertinent 
opinions that citations to The Federalist Papers have rarely been important to Supreme Court decisions). 
 102. See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. 
REV. 63, 69–76 (2008). 
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Court jurisprudence.103 
This study employed a straightforward approach to case selection and 
coding by employing methods of content analysis.104 All cases decided by signed 
opinion of the Court during Justice Scalia’s career, in which the Court decided 
a disputed issue of Fourth Amendment law, are included within the study.105 
After review of the opinions in those cases, each that expressed a view on a 
disputed question of Fourth Amendment law was coded. The study employed 
three codes: Originalist (“O”), Nonoriginalist (“NO”), and Nonoriginalist But 
Original Meaning Considered (“NOBOMC”). To code opinions, the two criteria 
for originalist adjudication stated above—fixation and constraint—were 
employed. 
An opinion was coded O when it relied upon historical evidence or 
otherwise invoked the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment as fixed at 
framing and ratification—thereby reflecting fixation—and when it also utilized 
original meaning to reach a determination on the issue of Fourth Amendment 
law before the Court—thereby reflecting constraint. It would have been 
unrealistic, however, to code as originalist only opinions that rely on nothing  
 
 
 103. A somewhat similar methodology for coding, albeit to a different end and unaccompanied by anything 
approaching random case selection, was used by Jamal Greene, who, in order to assess the circumstances under 
which the Supreme Court employs originalism, coded as originalist those opinions in which references to debates 
over the Constitution’s ratification or the views or expectations of the framing generation “form a significant 
part of the opinion’s affirmative analysis,” while cautioning that an opinion in which these materials “are not 
mentioned, are merely gestured at, or are described only as consistent with an outcome reached through other 
methods is not an originalist opinion.” Greene, supra note 28, at 1659. Professor Greene did not purport to utilize 
a representative dataset, however, but instead selected particular cases to study. Id. at 1658–80. This 
methodology may be sufficient, as Professor Greene suggested, “to support a strong hypothesis that others are 
free to test, whether through intuition, anecdote, or more rigorous methods,” id. at 1658, but given its potential 
for selection bias, it must be viewed with skepticism.  
 104. The following discussion sets out the protocol utilized for coding in this study. All Supreme Court 
opinions containing Fourth Amendment holdings within the relevant time frame, after initial review by student 
researchers, were reviewed and coded by the author. For a helpful discussion of best practices in undertaking 
content analysis of judicial opinions that informed the design of this study, see Hall & Wright, supra note 102, 
at 100–16. A complete list of opinions and their coding in this study is provided in the Appendix. 
 105. The study included two cases in which there was no opinion of the Court joined by a majority, but 
instead signed lead opinions announcing the judgment of the Court and joined by a plurality: O’Connor v. 
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (plurality), and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (plurality). Opinions in which 
Fourth Amendment law is discussed, but in which the Court does not actually decide any question of Fourth 
Amendment law, are not included in the study. For examples, see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) 
(plurality) (the Due Process Clause does not govern pretrial deprivations of liberty), and Wallace v. Kato, 549 
U.S. 384 (2007) (the rule for accrual of damages claims arising from wrongful arrest). Unsigned per curiam 
opinions were excluded from the study because they are often issued in cases regarded as relatively routine that 
do not require a detailed explanation of the Court’s reasoning. See Michael C. Gizzi & Stephen L. Wasby, Per 
Curiams Revisited: Assessing the Unsigned Opinion, 96 JUDICATURE 110, 112–13 (2012) (“Many per curiam 
opinions are used to resolve routine matters or issues that do not require a full explanation of the Court’s 
reasoning.”); see also STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 350–57 (10th ed. 2013) 
(describing the Court’s practice of summary reversal by per curiam opinion and the objections it has 
engendered).  
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more than original meaning; judicial opinions often invoke multiple 
considerations in support of their conclusions.106 Accordingly, whenever an 
opinion employed historical evidence as part of an opinion’s resolution of a 
disputed question of Fourth Amendment law, the opinion reflects, at least to 
some extent, both fixation and constraint, and was therefore coded O, even if an 
opinion also referenced nonoriginalist considerations.107 However, an opinion’s 
reference to the text of the Fourth Amendment, without more, did not suffice to 
code that opinion O. When an opinion gives the text the meaning that a 
contemporary reader would afford it, without reference to original meaning, 
fixation and constraint play no role in producing that meaning, and therefore the 
opinion does not fall within this study’s definition of originalism.108 In this 
fashion, the study’s methodology observed a distinction between nonoriginalist 
textualism and originalism. 
An opinion was coded NO when it made no reference to original meaning, 
invoking neither fixation nor constraint. Such opinions satisfy neither of the 
elements of the definition of originalism employed in this study, and were coded 
accordingly. 
An opinion was coded as NOBOMC when the opinion referenced historical 
evidence or otherwise invoked original meaning (potentially reflecting fixation), 
but found original meaning inadequate to resolve the issue before the Court or 
otherwise made no use of original meaning to resolve the issue before the Court, 
thereby failing to satisfy the constraint principle.109 Because these opinions do 
 
 106. Cf. Greene, supra note 28, at 1658–59 (“A typical constitutional opinion contains multiple modes of 
analysis. . . . To argue that an opinion is originalist only when originalism is the sole mode of analysis or when 
it is announced as dispositive is too demanding a measure.”). 
 107. For example, in Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999), Justice Scalia’s majority opinion 
concluded that on probable cause to search a vehicle, an officer can search packages belonging to a passenger 
based on both historical evidence of original meaning, id. at 300–02, and, “[e]ven if the historical evidence . . . 
were thought to be equivocal,” id. at 303, by reference to a nonoriginalist balancing test. Id. at 303–07. Houghton 
was coded “O” because the opinion used original meaning to resolve the issue before the Court, even though it 
also advanced a nonoriginalist basis for decision. 
 108. For example, in Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004), the Court held that a search authorized by a 
warrant that did not identify the items to be seized did not comport with the Fourth Amendment, even though 
the application for the warrant properly identified those items, because the warrant contravened the particularity 
requirement found in the text of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 557–63. The opinion of the Court in Groh 
was coded “NO” because the Court neither made a reference to nor did it place any reliance on historical 
evidence of original meaning. 
 109. In opinions addressing multiple issues, only the portions of the opinion resolving a disputed question 
of Fourth Amendment law were coded. For example, in Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999), which involved 
questions of Fourth Amendment law and qualified immunity, only the portion of the opinion resolving a disputed 
question of Fourth Amendment law (whether the Fourth Amendment permits reporters to accompany officials 
executing an otherwise valid search warrant) was coded. When an opinion contained a discussion of more than 
one issue of Fourth Amendment law, only the portion of the opinion resolving the primary Fourth Amendment 
issue in the case was coded. The primary issue, in turn, was determined by reference to the length of the 
discussion addressing each question of Fourth Amendment law in the opinion. For example, in Atwater v. City 
of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), the Court rejected an argument that Atwater’s warrantless custodial arrest 
violated the Fourth Amendment because it was inconsistent with Framing-era common law, id. at 326–45, and 
an argument that a custodial arrest for a nonjailable offense in the absence of a showing of need for immediate 
detention is an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, id. at 345–54. Because the 
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not reflect constraint, they do not fall within the definition of originalism 
employed by this study. Nevertheless, because these opinions consider evidence 
of original meaning, they reflect a high likelihood that their use of nonoriginalist 
grounds for decision is not the result of a failure to consider potential originalist 
grounds of decision, but instead the inadequacy of original meaning to resolve 
the issue before the Court. 
Coding was based exclusively on the claims made in an opinion, and did 
not involve any assessment of the soundness of an opinion’s use of 
originalism.110 
To prevent stare decisis from skewing the study’s results, when an opinion 
relied on a prior precedent to resolve a disputed issue of Fourth Amendment law, 
the earlier opinion was reviewed and coded, and the code was then applied to 
the subsequent case. Accordingly, opinions that relied on originalist precedent 
to decide a question of Fourth Amendment law were coded that way.111 This 
procedure ensured that an opinion’s reliance on precedent did not obscure the 
role of original meaning in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Justices’ individual votes were coded based on the code assigned to the 
opinions that each joined in each case. When a Justice joined more than one 
opinion, if any of the opinions that the Justice joined was coded O, the Justice’s 
vote was coded that way; if not, and if any of the opinions that the Justice joined 
was coded as NOBOMC, the Justice’s vote was coded that way.112 This  
 
 
opinion devoted more words to the former holding, that was the holding coded in this study. The dissenting 
opinion, in contrast, considered only the latter argument. id. at 360–73 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). It was 
therefore this discussion that was coded for the dissenting opinion.  
 110. For example, the Court’s treatment of the historical evidence of original meaning in Atwater has been 
subject to fierce criticism. See generally Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order 
Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago 
Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239 (2002) (offering a detailed critique of Justice Souter’s majority opinion in 
Atwater and contending that the opinion’s “supposed historical analysis” consisted entirely of “historical ploys 
and distortions of the historical sources”). Nevertheless, the opinion of the Court in Atwater was coded “O.” 
 111. For example, in Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), neither Justice White’s plurality opinion nor 
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, which assessed whether aerial observations of the interior of a 
greenhouse amounted to an unconstitutional search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, made any 
reference to historical evidence of Framing-era meaning. Rather, to determine the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection, both opinions relied principally on the earlier decision involving aerial surveillance of 
a fenced-in backyard in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). See Riley, 488 U.S. at 449–52 (plurality 
opinon); id. at 452–55 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Ciraolo was decided outside the study period, 
but it was reviewed and coded O because it made use of the Framing-era concept of “curtilage” as identifying 
the extent of the Fourth Amendment’s protections for property associated with a home. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 
212–13. Accordingly, the opinions of Justice White and Justice O’Connor in Riley were also coded O.  
 112. In cases in which Justices voted but did not write or join any opinion, their votes were not coded. For 
an example, see Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990), in which Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun 
dissented without opinion. In cases in which the only opinion that a Justice joined does not reach any question 
of Fourth Amendment law, even when the opinion of the Court in the same case did so, that vote was not coded. 
For an example, see Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23–34 (1995), in which Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting 
opinion, but only addressed the jurisdictional issue in the case. 
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procedure ensured that all references to original meaning were reflected in the 
coding of votes, even when a Justice also joined an opinion that relied on 
nonoriginalist grounds. 
II.  RESULTS 
Table 1 endeavors to identify a baseline rate at which originalism appears 
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It reflects the manner in which opinions of 
the Court during the study period (Justice Scalia’s career on the Court) 
addressing disputed questions of Fourth Amendment law were coded: 
TABLE 1: OPINIONS OF THE COURTa 
1986–2016b NO NOBOMC O 







a Plurality opinions were coded as opinions of the Court in O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), 
and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
b Includes only opinions in cases decided during Justice Scalia’s tenure. 
Table 1 shows that originalist decisions represent a small fraction of the 
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Table 1 does not reflect, 
however, what may be varying individual commitments to originalist 
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To identify the methodology reflected in the voting behavior of individual 
Justices, Table 2 (below) reflects the coding of votes cast by each Member of 
the Court (listed in order of appointment) in cases in which the Justice wrote or 
joined an opinion addressing a disputed question of Fourth Amendment law: 
TABLE 2: VOTES CAST BY EACH JUSTICEC 

















































































































































c Includes only opinions in cases decided during Justice Scalia’s tenure. 
As Table 2 illustrates, despite his professed commitment to originalism, 
Justice Scalia voted on originalist grounds in only 18.63% of cases in which the 
Court decided a disputed question of Fourth Amendment law. This is the highest 
rate of any Justice in the study, but not strikingly higher than the rate at which  
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originalism appeared in opinions of the Court (13.73%). In a slightly higher 
percentage of cases (20.59%), Justice Scalia referenced historical evidence or 
other indicia of original meaning, but did not cast his vote on that basis. 
Equally striking is the voting pattern of Justice Thomas, who has also 
professed fealty to originalism.113 Nevertheless, his votes were premised on 
originalist grounds in only 15.71% of cases. Justice Thomas, however, 
considered original meaning in 25.71% of cases—a higher percentage than 
Justice Scalia. This suggests not so much a lack of methodological commitment 
to originalism by Justice Thomas as the inability of originalism, in his view, to 
provide answers to the questions of Fourth Amendment law before the Court. 
Notably, virtually all members of the Court exhibited some willingness to 
base decisions on originalist grounds, despite their individual methodological 
commitments. For example, in his extrajudicial writing, Justice Breyer has 
professed opposition to originalism, cataloging what he regards as its defects.114 
Nevertheless, his votes were based on originalist grounds in 10.45% of cases, a 
rate of originalist voting about two-thirds the rate of Justice Thomas. Justice 
Brennan’s rate of originalist voting in Fourth Amendment cases was even higher 
(11.54%), yet, in his extrajudicial writing, Justice Brennan argued that Justices 
should read the Constitution in light of its contemporary rather than original 
meaning, embracing a nonoriginalist textualism.115 Only Justice Alito cast no 
votes on originalist grounds, although he considered original meaning in more 
than one-third of Fourth Amendment cases. It seems that all Justices are willing 
to consult original meaning when they regard it as helpful in deciding the case 
at hand. 
To investigate the possibility that Justice Scalia is more likely to reflect his 
own methodological commitments in his own opinions, Table 3 reflects the 
manner in which opinions written by Justice Scalia were coded, distinguishing 
between opinions of the Court (in which he successfully obtained support of at 
least four other Justices) and separate opinions in which Justice Scalia 
experienced no evident need to gain support from other Justices with potentially 
differing methodological commitments. 
 
 
 113. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 812 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment in part); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692–94 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1996). Justice Scalia identified Justice Thomas as a 
fellow originalist. See Scalia, supra note 35, at 871 (“Today, the secret is out that I am an originalist, and there 
is even a second one sitting with me, Justice Clarence Thomas.”). 
 114. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 115–32 
(2005). 
 115. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 
27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986) (“Current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we can: as 
twentieth-century Americans. We look to the history of the time of framing and to the intervening history of 
interpretation. But the ultimate question must be: What do the words of the text mean in our time? For the genius 
of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the 
adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs. What the constitutional 
fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be the measure to the vision of our time.”). 
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TABLE 3: OPINIONS WRITTEN BY JUSTICE SCALIA  
 NO NOBOMC O 












Despite the need for a Justice assigned to write an opinion of Court to build 
a majority that must likely include Justices with a variety of methodological 
commitments, Table 3 indicates that Justice Scalia’s methodology did not vary 
substantially based on whether he was writing an opinion of the Court or a 
separate opinion. 
It is notable that Justice Scalia’s rate of originalist voting in opinions that 
he authored is nearly twice the rate of his overall originalist voting reflected in 
Table 2, and his rate of considering original meaning in opinions that he authored 
is substantially higher as well. In cases in which he did not write an opinion, 
perhaps Justice Scalia was willing to defer to the methodological preferences of 
the author of the opinion. The soundness of this speculation, however, is open 
to question. After all, Justices hoping to have Justice Scalia join their opinions 
presumably had an incentive to write in a fashion likely to garner his support, 
and for that reason they would have had reason to advance originalist grounds 
for decision when available. Justice Scalia’s rate of originalist grounds of 
decision in his own opinions may instead be a function of his greater willingness 
to write separately, or greater engagement in the case that might result in his 
being assigned the opinion of the Court or deciding to write separately, when a 
case presented an opportunity for consideration of original meaning.116 Still, 
even when Justice Scalia was writing separately, with no apparent need to state 
any views but his own, he based his opinions on originalist grounds in only one-
third of cases. 
As we have seen, Justice Scalia professed adherence to originalism 
throughout his tenure on the Court.117 Nevertheless, to investigate the possibility 
that Justice Scalia’s commitment to originalism varied over time, Table 4 breaks 




 116. A comparison between Tables 1 and 3 indicates that Justice Scalia was assigned to write opinions of 
the Court disproportionately; he wrote the opinion of the Court in 19 of the 102 cases in the study period 
(18.63%), almost double the rate (one-ninth) that one would expect if assignments were random. 
 117. See supra text accompanying notes 35–36. 
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TABLE 4: VOTES CAST BY JUSTICE SCALIA (5-YEAR INTERVALS)  











































Table 4 reflects no obvious shift in Justice Scalia’s methodological 
commitments over time. At the beginning and end of his career, Justice Scalia’s 
rate of voting on originalist grounds differed little. Although Justice Scalia cast 
no originalist votes in the period 2007–2011, and only one in the period 1992–
1996, his rate of originalist votes both before and after those periods was 
substantial. However, it is unlikely that this suggests a decreased commitment 
to originalism as the cases before the Court in those two periods were likely not 
resolvable through the Fourth Amendment’s original meaning, at least in Justice 
Scalia’s view. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
Some commentators have argued that Justice Scalia’s commitment to 
originalism was inconsistent, and therefore doubted the sincerity of his professed 
adherence to that methodology.118 Indeed, this study indicates that at least when 
it comes to Fourth Amendment law, Justice Scalia (and Justice Thomas as well) 
frequently did not cast their votes on originalist grounds. Justices Scalia and  
 
 
 118. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE 
MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 29–54 (2002); Barnett, supra note 41, at 13–16; Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385, 391–99 
(2000); Gene R. Nichol, Justice Scalia and the Printz Case: The Trials of an Occasional Originalist, 70 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 953, 969–73 (1999); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s 
Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 562–69 (2006); see also SEGALL, supra note 16, at 123–40 (also 
discussing Justice Thomas’s commitment to originalism). 
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Thomas employed originalism to decide a disputed question of Fourth 
Amendment law in less than one-fifth of cases. This Part shifts from empiricism 
to analysis in an effort to explain the relatively low rate of originalist 
adjudication in the study. 
One might speculate that the voting patterns of Justices Scalia and Thomas 
may be attributable to their lack of commitment to originalism, the influence of 
nonoriginalist precedent, the parties’ failure to press originalist arguments, or 
perhaps a lack of any need to consider original meaning in some proportion of 
Fourth Amendment cases. A close analysis of the cases in the study, however, 
suggests that speculation along these lines is not a likely explanation. Instead, 
the difficulties in applying original meaning to contemporary search and seizure 
litigation suggest that even a sincere originalist determined to prioritize that 
method of adjudication above all others would find originalism of limited 
utility.119 It is not that Justices Scalia and Thomas rejected originalist grounds of 
decision in the cases in this study in favor of some alternative, or that the results 
somehow obscure their commitment to originalism; instead, the available 
historical evidence suggests that originalism does not offer much in the way of 
useful guidance in deciding the cases coded NO or NOBOMC. The voting 
patterns of Justices Scalia and Thomas are likely the result of the inability of 
originalism to offer a vehicle for deciding the cases before them. 
A. UNVARNISHED NONORIGINALISM 
It is striking how many opinions in this study, even when authored by 
avowed originalists such as Justice Scalia, make no reference to the original 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. When one considers the particular areas of 
Fourth Amendment law in which this result was observed, however, rather than 
finding an insincere commitment to originalism, the influence of nonoriginalist 
precedent, the lack of any need to consult original meaning, or a failure of the 
parties to press available originalist grounds of decision, one encounters instead 
the difficulties of constructing an originalist alternative to the nonoriginalist 
approach taken in the opinions coded NO. Consider the following examples. 
1. Probable Cause 
All of the opinions in this study that address the constitutional standard for  
 
 
 119. For scholarship arguing that the historical evidence surrounding the Fourth Amendment is often 
conflicting or indeterminate, see, for example, Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for 
History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1732–47 (1996); Mannheimer, supra note 91, at 1237–63; and Sklansky, supra 
note 78, at 1794–1813. For scholarship considering the difficulties of applying historical evidence of original 
meaning to contemporary problems of search and seizure, see, for example, Anthony G. Amsterdam, 
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 395–401 (1974); Davies, supra note 80, at 740–
50; and Donald A. Dripps, Responding to the Challenges of Contextual Change and Legal Dynamism in 
Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 81 MISS. L.J. 1085, 1101–21 (2012). 
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probable cause were coded NO, and despite that, all of them were joined by both 
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas (two were even written by Justice Scalia).120 
The historical record of probable cause, however, suggests that originalism has 
little to offer on this question. 
In the Framing-era, there was little agreement on the meaning of probable 
cause, which was often stated in ways not clearly distinct from suspicion.121 It 
was also not clear that officials assessed the adequacy of the evidence supporting 
the assertion of probable cause in applications for warrants.122 In the face of this 
historical record, originalism offers little reliable guidance. Small wonder, then, 
that opinions addressing the standard of probable cause make little use of 
historical evidence of original meaning as fixed at the time of framing and 
ratification. 
2. Warrantless Search and Seizure 
The limits of the historical record similarly infect other basic questions of 
Fourth Amendment law. For example, consider the elemental question about 
whether search and seizure not previously authorized by a warrant should be 
regarded as “reasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Most  
 
 
 120. See Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 240 (2013) (considering how a court should determine if the “alert” 
of a drug-detection dog during a traffic stop provides probable cause to search a vehicle); United States v. 
Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97 (2006) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (holding that the affidavit established probable cause to 
believe that the triggering event, the delivery of child pornography, would be satisfied); Devenpeck v. Alford, 
543 U.S. 146, 152–56 (2004) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (declining to require probable cause be closely related to the 
arresting offense because that would be inconsistent with the Court’s precedent that an officer’s state of mind is 
irrelevant to probable cause); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 374 (2003) (holding that the officer had 
probable cause to believe Pringle committed the offense). In an opinion issued shortly before the study period, 
the Court, in passing, sought a measure support for its definition of probable cause from an 1813 opinion of 
Chief Justice Marshall. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (“[T]he term ‘probable cause,’ according 
to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation . . . . It imports a seizure 
made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.” (quoting Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 
348 (1813)) (internal quotation marks omitted))). This formulation, however, stops well short of the test the 
Court adopted in Gates: “The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision 
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of 
knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of 
a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. at 238; see also Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 
(2018) (“Probable cause ‘is not a high bar.’” (citation omitted)). 
 121. See, e.g., Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Death of Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1275, 1314 (2010); 
Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Modern History of Probable Cause, 78 TENN. L. REV. 377, 384–98 (2011); see 
also Thomas Y. Davies, How the Post-Framing Adoption of the Bare-Probable-Cause Standard Drastically 
Expanded Government Arrest and Search Power, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 35–50 (2010) (describing 
inconsistencies in Framing-era formulations of probable cause). Contemporary Fourth Amendment doctrine 
draws a clear distinction between probable cause and mere suspicion, even if reasonable. See, e.g., Alabama v. 
White, 496 U.S. 325, 330–31 (1990); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 
U.S. 325, 340–47 (1985); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207–16 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880–82 (1975).  
 122. See, e.g., Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law History of 
Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 17–54 (2007); Oliver, supra note 121, at 384–89. But 
see Davies, supra note 46, at 77 & n.122 (concluding that Framing-era judges reviewed the adequacy of warrant 
applications alleging probable cause).  
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of the opinions of the Court addressing this issue during the study period were 
coded NO, with even Justices Scalia and Thomas usually writing or joining 
opinions resting on nonoriginalist grounds.123 This is a longstanding pattern; 
while the Court has sometimes required search and seizure to be authorized by 
warrant, the reasoning in these cases is nonoriginalist. Typical is the invocation 
of Justice Jackson’s pragmatic, if nonoriginalist, admonition that “a warrant 
ensures that the inferences to support a search are ‘drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”124 
There is good reason why an originalist inquiry into the breadth of a 
warrant requirement is rarely undertaken; the original meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment has little to offer. The text itself is silent on the question; it identifies 
the prerequisites for a valid warrant, but not whether a warrant is required to 
undertake search and seizure.125 This suggests that the question was of little 
concern in the Framing era. As for the available historical evidence, there is little 
in the way of agreement among scholars. There is, to be sure, consensus that the 
 
 123. These opinions, all of which, unless otherwise indicated, were joined by Justice Scalia and, after he 
joined the Court, Justice Thomas, are: Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292 (2014) (search of apartment based 
on consent of occupant after prior objection of co-occupant); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (blood 
test of arrestee) (Justice Thomas dissented on nonoriginalist grounds); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011) 
(forcible entry and search of residence on claim of exigent circumstances); City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 
746 (2010) (review of police officer’s text messages); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (search of vehicle 
incident to occupant’s arrest); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (opinion of Thomas, J.) (search of 
parolee’s residence); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (entry of residence to provide emergency aid); 
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004) (search of vehicle incident to arrest); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. 
Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (drug testing of students); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 
(2001) (search of probationer’s home); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (drug testing of 
obstetrics patients) (Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented on nonoriginalist grounds); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 
U.S. 33 (1996) (validity of consent to search); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) (scope of consent to 
search); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (search of residence on consent of 
occupant); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (search of items in plain view); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 
U.S. 91 (1990) (arrest of houseguest); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (protective sweep of residence 
incident to arrest); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug testing of law 
enforcement employees) (Justice Scalia dissented on nonoriginalist grounds); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ 
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (drug testing of railway employees); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) 
(opinion of Scalia, J.) (search of probationer’s home); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (search of 
automobile junkyard); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (search and seizure of items 
in plain view); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (inventory search of vehicles). 
 124. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 
(1948)). For examples of the Court’s invocation of this rationale, see United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 
(1984) (warrantless monitoring of electronic tracking device); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 
(1981) (warrantless entry of home to arrest guest); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 & n.24 (1980) 
(warrantless entry of home to arrest resident); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971) (warrant 
issued by state attorney general invalid). 
 125. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.”). 
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Fourth Amendment was originally understood to prohibit search and seizure 
based on general warrants.126 After that, however, agreement breaks down. 
Some scholars have pointed to Framing-era evidence that warrantless search and 
seizure was often permitted to conclude that the Fourth Amendment’s original 
meaning is inconsistent with a warrant requirement.127 Others have noted the 
Framing-era acceptance of particularized warrants and argue that the original 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment treated judicial authorization as preferable 
to warrantless intrusions,128 although some have cautioned that the Framing-era 
warrant requirement was likely confined to searches of residences.129 Some 
think that the historical evidence points to no reliable conclusion.130 
Beyond these difficulties, there is a perhaps more fundamental question 
about whether the Framing-era context renders the original understanding 
irrelevant to contemporary search and seizure. In the Framing-era, there was no 
equivalent to contemporary police; law enforcement was undertaken primarily 
by constables, sheriffs, and the night watch, whose duties were largely confined 
to executing judicial orders and responding to breaches of the peace.131 As 
George Thomas put it, what Framing-era officials “did not do was investigate 
crime.”132 Instead, as Wesley Oliver observed, “For most crimes, [victims] alone 
conducted the investigation, identified suspects, and determined whether their 
suspicions were adequate to initiate a criminal prosecution.”133 
Moreover, tort liability circumscribed the authority of Framing-era law 
enforcement officials; although officers executing a warrant had immunity from 
tort liability, officers who sought warrants could face personal liability in tort if  
 
 
 126. CUDDIHY, supra note 71, at 770–72; GRAY, supra note 78, at 139–43; LANDYNSKI, supra note 43, at 
19–48; NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 100–03 (1937); STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 22–34 (2012); TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND SURVEILLANCE AND FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 
29–44 (1969); Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 
977, 978–90 (2004); Davies, supra note 80, at 600–18; Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment’s Two 
Clauses, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389, 1391–94 (1989). 
 127. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 3–17 
(1997); TAYLOR, supra note 126, at 38–44; Arcila, supra note 121, at 1280–1326.  
 128. See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 126, at 30–36; ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789–1868, at 50–54, 61–65 (2006); Tracey Maclin, The 
Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 950–72 (1997). 
 129. See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 71, at 739–45, 773–77; Donohue, supra note 79, at 1276–80, 1321–24; 
David E. Steinberg, Restoring the Fourth Amendment: The Original Understanding Revisited, 33 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 47, 62–69 (2005).  
 130. See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 119, at 1745–47; Davies, supra note 80, at 550–52; Wasserstrom, supra 
note 126, at 1394–96. 
 131. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 28–29, 68 (1993); Davies, 
supra note 110, at 419–32; Dripps, supra note 119, at 1094–97; Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Neglected History 
of Criminal Procedure, 1850-1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 450–56 (2010); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts 
About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 830–32 (1994); George C. Thomas III, Stumbling Toward 
History: The Framers’ Search and Seizure World, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 199, 200–01, 225–28 (2010). 
 132. Thomas, supra note 131, at 201. 
 133. Oliver, supra note 121, at 382. 
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the search pursuant to warrant proved fruitless or if they undertook a warrantless 
search or seizure that a jury concluded had exceeded the officer’s lawful 
authority.134 
Given the limited duties of Framing-era public officers and the threat of 
personal liability that they faced, especially when they acted without 
authorization by warrant, warrantless search and seizure was likely a rarity. As 
one legal scholar concluded: “Warrantless searches and seizures were virtually 
nonexistent or at least uncontroversial.”135 Thus, there would have been little 
reason for the Framing generation to consider whether the Fourth Amendment 
embodied a preference for warrants in light of the limited authority and incentive 
for officers to act without them. 
The Framing-era regime of law enforcement proved unsatisfactory; in the 
nineteenth century, in response to increasing crime and social instability, cities 
began to establish police forces with investigative responsibilities.136 Moreover, 
as investigative responsibilities enlarged, to minimize the risk that newly-
empowered law enforcement personnel would be inhibited in the performance 
of their duties, exposure to tort liability diminished. Soon after the Constitution’s 
ratification, Congress began to expand the defenses available in actions arising 
from customs searches, apparently because of the perceived need to encourage 
officials to undertake such searches.137 Congress also began to indemnify public 
officials for judgments against them arising from the performance of their 
duties.138 Today, indemnification of police and other public officials is 
common.139 Moreover, since the Framing, a doctrine of official immunity from  
 
 
 134. See, e.g., Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Framers’ Search Power: The Misunderstood Statutory History of 
Suspicion & Probable Cause, 50 B.C. L. REV. 363, 371–79 (2009); Davies, supra note 80, at 624–34, 650–54; 
Davies, supra note 46, at 72–75, 91–93; Thomas, supra note 131, at 225–28; see also AMAR, supra note 127, at 
10–17 (discussing the immunity from tort liability conferred by a particularized warrant).  
 135. THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION § 2.2.1, at 41 (2d 
ed. 2014); cf. Davies, supra note 121, at 21 (“[T]he common-law authorities said virtually nothing about 
warrantless searches. The explanation for that silence seems to be partly that there was not much to search for 
(other than stolen property), and partly that it was assumed that an arrestee would routinely be searched for 
weapons or stolen goods whenever an arrest was made.”). 
 136. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 131, at 68–71; DAVID R. JOHNSON, POLICING THE URBAN 
UNDERWORLD: THE IMPACT OF CRIME ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN POLICE, 1800–1887, at 12–40 
(1979); THOMAS A. REPPETTO, THE BLUE PARADE 2–23 (1978); JAMES F. RICHARDSON, URBAN POLICE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 6–15, 19–32 (1974); SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 49–51 (1980); Dripps, supra note 119, at 1098–1101; Steiker, supra note 131, at 832–34. For a helpful 
discussion of the extent to which nineteenth-century police acquired new investigative powers, see Oliver, supra 
note 131, at 461–68. 
  137. See, e.g., Arcila, supra note 134, at 392–420; Davies, supra note 46, at 91–93. 
 138. See James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and 
Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1865–70 (2010). 
 139. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Constitutional 
Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 812–13 & n.51, 819–20 (2007); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police 
Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 912–37 (2014). 
108  HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:75 
tort liability has emerged.140 As currently understood, qualified immunity grants 
law enforcement officials a qualified immunity for unconstitutional conduct that 
does not violate clearly established law,141 and is justified by the potential for 
over-deterrence if public employees were strictly liable for their constitutional 
torts.142 
Accordingly, in light of the radical expansion in responsibilities of those 
engaged in law enforcement, and the concomitantly reduced role of tort liability 
in circumscribing the discretionary authority of public officials, there is reason 
to question whether the apparent lack of a warrant requirement in the Framing 
era has fair application to contemporary search and seizure.143 It may have been 
much easier to regard warrantless search and seizure as “reasonable” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment in the Framing-era regime, in which official 
authority was far more circumscribed, and the threat of personal liability in tort 
far greater, than today.144 The difficulties in applying historical evidence of 
original meaning to the vastly changed contemporary landscape of search and 
seizure seems to be the most likely explanation for the prevalence of 
nonoriginalism in cases considering a warrant requirement. 
3. Exclusion 
Similar difficulties arise in utilizing originalism to address whether 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment can be used in criminal 
prosecutions. 
All the cases in the study period addressing the question of exclusion were 
coded NO (although some mention original meaning on issues other than 
exclusion), and in all of these cases, even Justice Scalia and (after his 
appointment) Justice Thomas joined opinions based on nonoriginalist 
grounds.145 Notably, Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court (as well as an 
 
 140. See Sina Kian, The Path of the Constitution: The Original System of Remedies, How It Changed, and 
How the Court Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132, 150–58 (2012). 
 141. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–32 (2009); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 203–07 
(2001); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643–44 (1987).  
 142. See, e.g., Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 407–08 (1997); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167–
68 (1992); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525–26 (1985). 
 143. Cf. Davies, supra note 80, at 725 (“These developments . . . destroyed the common-law premises that 
had grounded the Framers’ belief that a ban against general warrants would suffice to ensure the right to be 
secure in person and house. Likewise, these developments undermined trespass actions against individual 
officers as a means of enforcing legal limits on search and arrest authority. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
the warrantless officer posed a far more potent threat to the security of person and house than the Framers had 
ever anticipated.” (footnote omitted)).  
 144. For incisive scholarly discussions along these lines, see Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal 
Procedure and Constitutional Law: “Here I Go Down that Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1595–
603 (1996), and Steiker, supra note 131, at 830–38, 852–56.  
 145. See generally Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (relying on Fourth Amendment precedent, 
and not original meaning, to enforce the use of the exclusionary rule); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 
(2009) (using the judicially-created deterrence effect rationale to hold that the exclusionary rule did not apply); 
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (coded NOBOMC because of references to the common-law knock-
and-announce principle) (holding that the social costs balanced against deterrence weighed in favor of not 
applying the exclusionary rule); Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) (opinion of Thomas, J.) 
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additional plurality opinion) in Hudson v. Michigan which, although doubtful of 
the case for exclusion, confined its criticism to nonoriginalist grounds.146 
Nevertheless, a handful of scholars have opposed the exclusionary rule on the 
ground that in the Framing era, the remedy for a wrongful search and seizure 
was an award of damages in tort.147 But, even granting that in the Framing era 
tort liability rather than exclusion was the order of the day, there are a variety of 
difficulties in making an originalist case against the exclusionary rule.148 
As we have seen, in the Framing era, search and seizure undertaken without 
a valid warrant presented a serious risk of personal liability in tort, and the 
Fourth Amendment had prohibited the general warrant—what the Framing 
generation likely perceived as the most serious threat of abusive search and 
seizure.149 This reliance on personal tort liability to constrain search and seizure 
authority, to be sure, presented a serious risk of over-deterrence; but if officials 
are not expected to perform much in the way of investigative activity, over-
deterrence is not of much concern. 
Once police forces emerged that were expected to proactively investigate 
crime, however, over-deterrence became a greater concern, and the reduced 
threat of personal liability that accompanied the emergence of indemnification 
and tort immunities meant that the threat of damages liability was no longer as 




(using a balancing calculus, rather than original meaning or textualism, to find that the exclusionary rule did not 
apply); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (noting that exclusion is not mandated by the text of the Fourth 
Amendment, but rather is a judicially created remedy); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) (coded 
NOBOMC because of references to the historical sanctity of the home) (using a balancing test to find that 
exclusion was not appropriate); James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990) (Justice Scalia joined Justice Kennedy’s 
nonoriginalist dissent) (arguing that the exclusionary rule did not apply because of the lack of a deterrent effect); 
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (rooting the independent source doctrine in 
its lack of a deterrent effect rather than in a historical use); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (same, except 
discussing the good-faith exception). 
 146. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 590–99; id. at 599–602 (plurality). 
 147. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 127, at 20–22; William Gangi, The Exclusionary Rule: A Case Study in 
Judicial Usurpation, 34 DRAKE L. REV. 33, 39–46, 125–29 (1984–1985). Indeed, in the Framing era, the fact 
that a search produced incriminating evidence was considered a defense to tort liability. AMAR, supra note 127, 
at 7; Arcila, supra note 121, at 1316–17. There is some debate, however, about whether this defense was 
recognized for a trespass to a residence. Compare Davies, supra note 80, at 647–49 (denying the existence of a 
defense), with Arcila, supra note 121, at 1317–24 (arguing that the defense was recognized).  
 148. For an effort to justify exclusion on originalist grounds, see Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the 
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 1 (2009–2010); and Roger Roots, The Framers’ Fourth 
Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Mounting Evidence, 15 NEV. L.J. 42 (2014). For skeptical responses, see 
Lawrence Rosenthal, Seven Theses in Grudging Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 525, 
532–33 (2013); and Rohith V. Srinivas, The Exclusionary Rule as Fourth Amendment Judicial Review, 49 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 179, 205 (2012). 
 149. See e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 71, at 771–72; Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary 
Rule Rest on a “Principled Basis” Rather than an “Empirical Proposition”?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 571–
79 (1983). 
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circumstances, accordingly, tort remedies have been drained of much of their 
potency, and therefore the case for an exclusionary remedy is far more powerful 
than in the Framing era.150 This evidence suggests that the disappearance of the 
Framing-era regime of tort liability offers a compelling explanation for the 
absence of originalism in contemporary exclusionary rule jurisprudence. The 
nonoriginalism prevalent in exclusionary rule jurisprudence, in other words, is 
less an artifact of the force of nonoriginalist precedent than a reflection of the 
difficulties of developing an authentically originalist alternative to exclusion. 
B. HISTORICALLY-MINDED NONORIGINALISM 
Opinions were coded NOBOMC when they consulted original meaning yet 
found it inadequate to resolve the matter before the Court. These opinions are of 
special interest because they reflect a high likelihood that a failure to utilize 
original meaning to resolve the issue before the Court is not the result of judicial 
inadvertence, nonoriginalist precedent, or the parties’ failure to press originalist 
arguments. Indeed, these opinions reflect the difficulties of applying original 
meaning to contemporary problems of search and seizure. Again, some 
examples illustrate the point. 
1. Warrantless Search and Seizure 
As we have seen, there is great difficulty in developing an originalist view 
of the circumstances under which the Fourth Amendment requires that search 
and seizure be authorized by warrant.151 Thus, it should be unsurprising that the 
professed originalist Justices in this study, while taking some care to examine 
the historical evidence, ultimately found it inconclusive. 
For example, Justice Thomas, in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, wrote: 
“[T]he [Fourth] Amendment’s history, which is clear as to the Amendment’s 
principal target (general warrants), [is] not as clear with respect to when warrants 
were required, if ever.”152 Similarly, Justice Scalia acknowledged: “[C]hanges 
in the surrounding legal rules (for example, elimination of the common-law rule 
that reasonable, good-faith belief was no defense to absolute liability for 
trespass) may make a warrant indispensable to reasonableness where it once was 
not.”153 Thus, these opinions strongly suggest that it is the difficulties in utilizing 
the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment to illuminate the reach of 
warrantless search-and-seizure authority that explain the prevalence of 
nonoriginalist opinions in this area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.154 
 
 150. For more extensive arguments along these lines, see Dripps, supra note 144, at 1598–1600; Rosenthal, 
supra note 148, at 532–37; and Steiker, supra note 131, at 847–52. 
 151. See supra Subpart III.A.2. 
 152. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 572 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 153. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations 
omitted). 
 154. Some scholars, focusing on the Fourth Amendment’s incorporation within the Fourteenth, have argued 
that the Fourth Amendment’s meaning should be assessed as it was understood at the time of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ratification. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
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2. School and Other Special-Needs Searches 
Another example in which originalism has offered even originalist Justices 
little aid involves searches justified in terms of particular governmental interests 
with little in the way of Framing-era antecedents. 
The Court confronted the question whether random drug testing of athletes 
at a public high school violated the Fourth Amendment in Vernonia School 
District 47J v. Acton.155 Justice Scalia’s opinion of the Court, joined by Justice 
Thomas, acknowledged the eighteenth-century rule that when parents place their 
children in schools the school acts in loco parentis and is permitted to exercise 
wide-ranging parental powers,156 but nevertheless described the case as one 
“where there was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type of 
search at issue, at the time the constitutional provision was enacted,” reasoning 
that the emergence of compulsory school attendance laws, as well as the drug 
problem and drug-testing technology called for a reasonableness test for 
assessing school searches not derived from historical evidence of fixed, original 
meaning, but instead “judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s 
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.”157 
In a later opinion joined by Justice Scalia, the Court applied this 
nonoriginalist balancing test to hold that requiring a student to remove her 
clothes down to her underwear as school officials searched for unauthorized 
prescription-strength medication violated the Fourth Amendment.158 Justice  
 
 
RECONSTRUCTION 219–30, 267–68 (1998); TASLITZ, supra note 128, at 242–56. The prevailing understanding 
of the Fourth Amendment at the time, however, was little developed from the Framing era; the leading 
commentators of the era offered little more than the view that the Fourth Amendment forbade general warrants. 
See, e.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE 
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 299–308 (Little, Brown & Co. 1868); JOHN 
NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 153–54 (Hurd & 
Houghton 1868); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1902 
(Little, Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1873) (1833). Moreover, an officer’s exposure to tort liability for exceeding the 
scope of his authority persisted at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framing and ratification. See, e.g., 1 
JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 168, 181 (Little, Brown & 
Co. 2d ed. 1872) (1866); WM. L. CLARK, JR., HAND-BOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 20–21, 34–44, 47 (W. 
Publ’g Co. 1895). Contemporary commentators who have argued for a Reconstruction-era understanding of the 
Fourth Amendment argue only that it requires greater sensitivity to racial discrimination in search and seizure 
when administering the search-and-seizure law. See, e.g., AMAR, supra, at 267–68; TASLITZ, supra, at 256–57; 
I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2011); Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: 
Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 918–26 
(2015). 
 155. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
 156. Id. at 654–55. 
 157. Id. at 652–53 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 158. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370–77 (2009). 
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Thomas, however, disagreed on originalist grounds, contending that the 
Framing-era rule of in loco parentis should be incorporated within the Fourth 
Amendment, thereby granting school officials essentially unlimited parental 
authority over students at school.159 Yet, as we have seen, in Acton (which 
Justice Thomas joined), Justice Scalia rejected this approach, noting that the 
advent of contemporary compulsory school attendance laws rendered the 
Framing-era rule inapplicable. 
It is far from clear that there is any originalist methodology available for 
determining whether the Framing-era doctrine of in loco parentis should retain 
its force once school attendance become compulsory, rather than purely a 
creature of contract. Justice Scalia’s position on this issue appears to reflect the 
difficulties of applying Framing-era understanding in a changed context rather 
than an insufficient commitment to originalist adjudication. 
School search cases are an example of the “special needs” doctrine, in 
which searches and seizures thought to “serve[] special governmental needs, 
beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” are assessed not through an 
originalist methodology reflecting fixation and constraint, but instead by 
“balanc[ing] the individual’s privacy expectations against the Government’s 
interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level 
of individualized suspicion in the particular context.”160 All of the opinions in 
the study addressing special-needs justifications for search and seizure were 
coded as nonoriginalist, either NO or NOBOMC.161 Because these cases involve 
governmental functions or interests that, like compulsory public education, lack  
 
 
 159. Id. at 398–402 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 160. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989). 
 161. In addition to the school-search cases discussed above, the opinions in the special-needs cases, all of 
which, unless otherwise indicated, were joined by Justice Scalia and, after he joined the Court, Justice Thomas, 
are: City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015) (record-keeping requirements for hotels) (Justice 
Scalia’s dissent mentions Framing-era regulation of hotels but he does not base his dissenting vote on that 
ground); Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013) (DNA testing of arrestees) (Justice Scalia’s dissent mentions a 
Framing-era rule against general warrants but he does not base his dissenting vote on that ground); Missouri v. 
McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (blood test of arrestee) (Justice Thomas dissented on nonoriginalist grounds); 
City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) (review of police officer’s text messages); Samson v. California, 
547 U.S. 843 (2006) (search of parolee’s residence) (written by Justice Thomas); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 
419 (2004) (checkpoint to question potential witnesses); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 
U.S. 822 (2002) (drug testing of students); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (search of probationer’s 
home); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (drug testing of obstetrics patients) (Justices Scalia 
and Thomas dissented on nonoriginalist grounds); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001) (officer’s detention 
of suspect outside home pending issuance of warrant); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) 
(drug-detection checkpoint in which Justice Thomas’s dissent mentioned that the Framers might have 
disapproved of such a roadblock but he did not base his decision on that ground); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 
305 (1997) (drug-testing of candidates); Mich. Dep’t of St. Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety 
checkpoint); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug testing of law enforcement 
employees) (Justice Scalia dissented on nonoriginalist grounds); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 
602 (1989) (drug testing of railway employees); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (written by Justice 
Scalia) (search of probationer’s home); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (search of automobile 
junkyard); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (search of public employee’s office) (Justice Scalia 
concurring on nonoriginalist grounds). 
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a Framing-era equivalent, it is perhaps unsurprising that originalism has offered 
little useful guidance even to members of the Court favorably inclined toward 
originalist adjudication. 
3. Cellphone Searches 
Yet another example of the inability of original meaning to offer a vehicle 
for deciding a disputed question of Fourth Amendment law involves the 
inspection of the digital contents of a cellphone incident to the otherwise lawful 
arrest of its owner. In Riley v. California,162 Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion of 
the Court (joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) characterized the question 
whether the contents of a cellphone can be inspected incident to an arrest as one 
on which there was no “guidance from the founding era,” therefore requiring the 
Court to evaluate the search “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which 
it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it 
is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”163 The Court 
reached this decision despite acknowledging the longstanding rule permitting 
the search of property in the possession of an arrestee incident to the arrest,164 
reasoning that a search of the digital contents of a cellphone involves a far 
greater intrusion on privacy than an inspection of physical objects found on an 
arrestee’s person.165 It is hard to disagree with this assessment; but, it means that 
originalism offers little useful guidance. Assessments of reasonableness made 
when all searches were physical do not help much to identify the Fourth 
Amendment constraints on digital searches. 
4. Stop and Frisk 
Consider as well the paradigmatically nonoriginalist stop-and-frisk holding 
of Terry. Terry was called into question by Justice Scalia, who doubted whether 
a physical search of an individual temporarily detained on suspicion would have 
been regarded as reasonable in the Framing era.166 Even so, Justice Scalia 
acknowledged the difficulties of an originalist assessment of Terry. 
In the Framing era, Justice Scalia observed, “it had long been considered 
reasonable to detain suspicious persons . . . . This is suggested, in particular, by 
the so-called night-walker statutes,” but, he added, “[w]hen . . . the detention did  
 
 
 162. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 163. Id. at 2484 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 164. Id. at 2482. 
 165. Id. at 2484–91. 
 166. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380, 380–82 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Scholars have also 
questioned the originalist credentials of Terry. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 80, at 629 n.216; Sklansky, supra 
note 78, at 1804–05; George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James Madison Sees 
the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451, 1514–16 (2005).  
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not rise to the level of a full-blown arrest (and was not supported by the degree 
of cause needful for that purpose), there appears to be no clear support at 
common law for physically searching the suspect.”167 Nevertheless, under the 
night-walker statutes, “the temporary detention of a suspicious character [c]ould 
be elevated to a full custodial arrest on probable cause—as, for instance, when 
a suspect was unable to provide a sufficient accounting of himself.”168 Thus, 
although there was no Framing-era understanding that it was reasonable to stop 
and frisk an individual except during a search incident to arrest, it was regarded 
reasonable to detain and even arrest suspicious individuals. Moreover, as Justice 
Scalia acknowledged, the development since the Framing era of highly efficient 
firearms may alter the calculus for whether an investigative frisk is “reasonable” 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when an officer approaches a 
potentially dangerous suspect.169 Given this conflicting evidence, Justice Scalia 
could reach no conclusion as to whether Terry’s “result was wrong.”170 Thus, 
the persistence of Terry and its nonoriginalist progeny seems an artifact of the 
difficulty in developing an originalist approach to stop-and-frisk, rather than the 
continuing effects of nonoriginalist precedent. Indeed, as we have seen, that 
problem repeatedly surfaces in the opinions coded NOBOMC in this study. An 
analysis of the manner in which constitutional text was employed and 
understood in the Framing era must account for the possibility that Framing-era 
usage was critically dependent on Framing-era context, and for that reason may 
not offer useful guidance under contemporary circumstances. 
C. LATENT NONORIGINALISM 
The difficulties in applying original meaning to contemporary search-and-
seizure litigation are reflected even in ostensibly originalist opinions. Indeed, 
there is reason to believe that this study’s methodology overstates the prevalence 
of Fourth Amendment originalism. 
Consider again United States v. Watson, in which the Court relied on a 
Framing-era rule to uphold warrantless felony arrests in public places based on 
probable cause.171 In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the Court’s 
reliance on the prevailing Framing-era rule permitting warrantless felony arrests 
was inapposite because “[o]nly the most serious crimes were felonies at common 
law, and many crimes now classified as felonies under federal or state law were  
 
 
 167. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 380–81 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 168. Id. at 381. This authority to arrest on suspicion persisted at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See generally 1 BISHOP, supra note 154, at § 182; JOHNSON, supra note 136, at 131–33. 
 169. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 382 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[E]ven if a ‘frisk’ prior to arrest would have 
been considered impermissible in 1791, perhaps it was considered permissible by 1868, when the Fourteenth 
Amendment (the basis for applying the Fourth Amendment to the States) was adopted. Or perhaps it is only 
since that time that concealed weapons capable of harming the interrogator quickly and from beyond arm’s reach 
have become common—which might alter the judgment of what is ‘reasonable’ under the original standard.”). 
 170. Id. 
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 57–58. 
December 2018]     AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY INTO THE USE OF ORIGINALISM 115 
   
treated as misdemeanors.”172 Although this attack on the contemporary 
relevance of the Framing-era distinction between felonies and misdemeanors 
failed in Watson, in Tennessee v. Garner,173 the Court held that the prevailing 
Framing-era rule authorizing the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon 
violated the Fourth Amendment, reasoning that this rule “arose at a time when 
virtually all felonies were punishable by death,” and was premised on “the 
relative dangerousness of felons,” while today, the distinction between felonies 
and misdemeanors is “minor and often arbitrary.”174 
Justice White was the author of both Watson and Garner. Yet, in Garner, 
Justice White, without explanation, embraced the same argument about the 
obsolescence of the Framing-era distinction between felonies and misdemeanors 
that he had implicitly rejected in Watson.175 Perhaps the two opinions can be 
reconciled; for example, Arnold Loewy speculated that “the Court was more 
concerned about unnecessary loss of life (Garner) than the unnecessary loss of 
process (Watson).”176 Whether this or some other ground explains the disparate 
outcomes, the conclusion seems inescapable that Justice White utilized some 
nonoriginalist methodology for justifying departures from Framing-era practice 
that led him to reject the contemporary relevance of Framing-era practice in 
some cases and not others. 
While Garner’s nonoriginalism is apparent, Watson rests on a latent 
nonoriginalism. Justice White implicitly concluded that the Framing-era 
distinction between felony and misdemeanor arrests had continuing relevance in 
Watson; yet nothing in Watson’s account of original meaning explains why that 
distinction retained its vitality when it came to arrests, though not when it came 
to the use of deadly force to effect those arrests. Although the methodology 
employed in this study codes Watson as originalist, in reality, that opinion rests 
critically on a nonoriginalist, if unstated, assessment of Justice Marshall’s claim 
that changes in distinction between felonies and misdemeanors rendered the 
Framing-era law of arrest inapposite. 
Once one starts looking for latent nonoriginalism, it appears readily.177 
Consider, again, the discussion in Boyd characterizing an order directing an 
 
 172. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 439–40 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 173. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 174. Id. at 13–14 (citations omitted).  
 175. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Substitute Arguments in Constitutional Law, 31 J.L. & POL. 237, 
238 (2016) (“Justice White . . . nowhere explained why Garner was distinguishable from Watson.”); Silas J. 
Wasserstrom, The Court’s Turn Toward a General Reasonableness Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119, 147 n.213 (1989) (“Justice White’s opinion for the Court in Watson ignored just the sort 
of arguments that he relied on in Garner.”). 
 176. Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment: History, Purpose, and Remedies, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 
3 (2010). 
 177. Cf. Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1232–42 (2012) (questioning the 
prevalence of originalism in constitutional adjudication by examining opinions commonly regarded as 
originalist). 
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importer to produce business records as an unreasonable search and seizure, 
relying on Framing-era conceptions about the search and seizure of private 
papers.178 When it described Framing-era “history of controversies on the 
subject,” the Court referenced the colonial experience with “writs of assistance 
to the revenue officers, empowering them, in their discretion, to search suspected 
places for smuggled goods,” and the “practice of issuing general warrants . . . 
for searching private houses for the discovery and seizure of books and papers 
that might be used to convict their owner of the charge of libel.”179 The Court 
acknowledged, however, that in the case before it, “certain aggravating incidents 
of actual search and seizure, such as forcible entry into a man’s house and 
searching amongst his papers, are wanting.”180 
Under scrutiny, Boyd’s originalism disappears; the Court identified no 
evidence that in the Framing era, an order to produce papers, unaccompanied by 
a forcible trespass onto private property, was considered an unreasonable search 
and seizure when not authorized by a warrant supported by a judicial finding of 
probable cause.181 Boyd, in short, critically rests on a nonoriginalist argument 
that a requirement to produce business records or other property, even if 
unaccompanied by the type of force and coercion that inhered in the Framing-
era conception of an unreasonable search and seizure, should nevertheless be 
regarded as a violation of the Fourth Amendment.182 That conclusion may be 
sound, but it is not anchored in original meaning. 
Latent nonoriginalism of this type is prevalent among the cases coded as 
originalist in this study. 
1. Warrantless Search and Seizure 
Cases in this study that relied on Carroll’s originalist justification for 
upholding warrantless search and seizure of vehicles based on the Framing-era 
rule that ships could be searched without a warrant were coded O.183 Yet, it is 
unclear whether there is substance to Carroll’s professed originalism. 
 
 
 178. See supra text accompanying notes 42–45. 
 179. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625–26 (1886). 
 180. Id. at 622.  
 181. In Boyd, Justice Miller made this very point; while acknowledging that the Fourth Amendment was 
crafted to “abolish[] searches under . . . general warrants,” he denied that “requir[ing] the production of evidence 
in a suit by mere service of notice on the party, who has that evidence in his possession, can be held to authorize 
an unreasonable search or seizure.” Id. at 641 (Miller, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 182. Cf. Davies, supra note 46, at 117 (“[T]he setting in Boyd was far removed from the Framers’ concern 
for the sanctity of the dwelling house and private papers.”); Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth 
Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 72 (“Famous search and seizure cases leading up to the Fourth 
Amendment involved physical entries into homes, violent rummaging for incriminating items once inside, and 
then arrests and the taking away of evidence found.”). 
 183. See Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999) (looking to the laws of the “First, Second, and Fourth 
Congresses that authorized federal officers to conduct warrantless searches of ships and to seize concealed goods 
subject to duties”); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (noting that around Framing customs officials 
had the ability to search any ship or vessel without a warrant if they had probable cause to believe that it 
contained goods subject to duty). 
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To equate contemporary searches of vehicles with Framing-era searches of 
ships, Carroll observed that for “a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or 
automobile . . . it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can 
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must 
be sought.”184 That contention, however, sounds more pragmatic than 
originalist.185 Indeed, Carroll identified no historical evidence to support its 
claim that the Framing era search and seizure authority turned on mobility; there 
is, in fact, little Framing-era evidence that sheds light on whether warrantless 
search and seizure was permitted for carts, carriages, or other types of moveable 
property.186 Perhaps the Framing-era tolerance for warrantless searches of ships 
rested on considerations other than mobility. 
Carroll’s originalism is, accordingly, dubious. Its claimed reliance on 
Framing-era practice sufficed to code it and its progeny originalist under this 
study’s coding methodology, but that claim may not withstand scrutiny.187 
2. Kyllo 
Consider again the holding that the warrantless use of a thermal imager to 
identify patterns of heat emanating from a home was an unreasonable search in 
Kyllo. The Court’s opinion was coded O because of its insistence on 
“preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted.”188 Yet, as we have seen in our consideration 
of Boyd, the Framing-era conception of an unreasonable search involved forcible 
entry and physical intrusion. What was regarded as an unreasonable search and 
seizure in the Framing era, accordingly, was far more coercive than passive 
electronic surveillance.189 We have no reliable way of knowing if passive  
 
 
 184. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). 
 185. Cf. Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative State: 
Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 130–31 (2006) (“Taft’s heroic effort [in Carroll] 
to reinterpret Fourth Amendment doctrine in light of the pragmatic needs of law enforcement, balanced against 
the interests of citizens to be free from arbitrary interference, essentially set the framework for modern search 
and seizure jurisprudence.” (footnote omitted)). 
 186. See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 71, at 767 (“[S]hips were subject to warrantless searches when the 
[Fourth] Amendment originated. The extent to which other vehicles were so subject is unknowable, however, 
for neither case law nor legislation had significantly illuminated the subject.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Arizona v. 
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he historical scope of officers’ authority to search 
vehicles incident to arrest is uncertain.”). 
 187. For attacks on the originalist bona fides of Carroll, see, for example, Davies, supra note 46, at 121–
24; Davies, supra note 80, at 606–08; Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth 
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 502–07 (2011); and Sklansky, supra note 78, at 1766–70. 
 188. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
 189. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364–67 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that wiretapping 
would have been regarded in the Framing era as eavesdropping not regulated by the Fourth Amendment); 
Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 177–
88 (observing that the Framing-era conception may have offered protection against physical intrusion rather than 
protection for privacy). 
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electronic surveillance—whether electronic eavesdropping as in Katz or the 
more limited information collected in Kyllo—would have been regarded in the 
Framing era as an unreasonable search or seizure. Notably, in his dissenting 
opinion in Kyllo, Justice Stevens argued that the privacy interest at stake was too 
trivial to be considered a search.190 
Orin Kerr has argued that both the majority and dissenting opinions in 
Kyllo reflect “equilibrium adjustment,” in which the Court responds to new 
investigative technologies by imposing constitutional regulation that restores the 
preexisting equilibrium between investigative authority and privacy, albeit 
without claiming that equilibrium adjustment is embedded in the original 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.191 The lack of any evidence that concern 
about equilibrium adjustment is reflected in the historical evidence of original 
meaning should be unsurprising; as we have seen, in the Framing era, public 
officials had little in the way of investigative authority.192 Maintaining 
equilibrium with respect to investigative authority, which was not yet an 
important feature of the criminal justice system, is an unlikely account of the 
Fourth Amendment’s original meaning. But, even if equilibrium adjustment can 
properly be characterized as originalist, the fact that it can justify both the 
majority and dissenting opinions in Kyllo makes plain that this methodology 
does not offer an originalist rule of decision in Kyllo. 
While it may be desirable to prevent advancing technology from eroding 
the privacy of the home, that view requires something more than an invocation 
of the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment; it requires a normative 
argument that any investigative technique that compromises the privacy of the 
home should be deemed an unreasonable search and seizure (absent a 
particularized warrant), even if unaccompanied by the type of force or coercion 
characteristic of search and seizure in the Framing era, and even if the privacy 
interest at stake may be trivial.193 After all, the Framing-era conception of an 
unreasonable search and seizure involved both an invasion of privacy and the 
 
 190. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 45–46 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 191. Kerr, supra note 187, at 496–99.  
 192. See supra text accompanying notes 131–143. 
 193. Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 119, at 403 (“The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment. It is 
whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated by 
constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a 
compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society. That, in outright terms, is the judgment lurking 
underneath the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz, and it seems to me the judgment that the fourth amendment 
inexorably requires the Court to make.”). Even commentators sympathetic to Kyllo frequently acknowledge that 
it rests on a normative judgment and not unadorned original meaning. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg 
Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court, Technology, and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5, 41–48 
(2002) (arguing that Kyllo reflects a judgment about the risks of surveillance that homeowners should be 
expected to bear); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine 
and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 166–70 (2002) (same); Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and 
Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MISS. L.J. 51, 61–72 (2002) 
(arguing that Kyllo rests on an unwillingness to engage in balancing); David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: 
Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 178–88 (2002) (arguing that Kyllo reflects a concern for 
privacy as a constitutional objective rather than adherence to Framing-era conceptions).  
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use of force to effect a physical intrusion. Electronic surveillance disaggregates 
the invasion of privacy from the use of force in a manner unknown in the 
Framing era. We have no reliable way of knowing whether the Framing-era 
conception of an unreasonable search and seizure included an invasion of 
privacy unaccompanied by the actual or threatened use of force against a 
suspect; the problem never arose. An invocation of original meaning, without 
more, will not enable us to decide whether electronic surveillance violates the 
Fourth Amendment.194 
3. Jones and Jardines 
Consider the holding that attaching a GPS device to the undercarriage of a 
vehicle and subsequently monitoring the device to track its movements was a 
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in United States v. 
Jones,195 and its extension to the use of a narcotics-detection dog on the front 
porch of a home to detect contraband therein in Florida v. Jardines.196 
Both opinions, written by Justice Scalia, were coded O because they rely 
on what they characterize as the original meaning of a “search” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment: “physically intruding” to acquire 
information.197 Yet, neither opinion identifies any Framing-era evidence to 
 
 194. A similar problem appears in Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), a case in many 
respects similar to Kyllo, albeit outside the study period. Carpenter addressed the question whether the 
government’s acquisition of historical cell-site location data from a cellphone provider, pursuant to a court order 
but in the absence of a valid warrant, which enabled it to determine the location of Carpenter’s cellphone at the 
times that a number of robberies occurred, amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure. The majority opinion 
answered the question in the affirmative, relying on Kyllo and stressing the extent to which cell-site location 
data expands the government’s ability to monitor individuals’ movements. Id. at 2223. This study would have 
coded the opinion as originalist based on its fealty to Kyllo, but as we have seen, Kyllo’s originalism is dubious. 
In their dissenting opinions in Carpenter, in contrast, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch contended that the original 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment extended protection only when an individual’s own person, house, papers, 
or effects were subject to search or seizure, and that Carpenter had not established that he had a property or other 
interest in the cell-location data sufficient to fall within that protection. Id. at 2241–43 (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Of course, the same could have been said about the thermal data acquired 
in Kyllo. Justice Alito added that the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment was not understood to govern 
the production of documents or other information pursuant to legal process. Id. at 2250–51 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
The majority, however, rejected these arguments, observing that cell-site location data gives the government 
access to far more pervasive information than anything that could have been obtained previously. Id. at 2220. 
We have no way of knowing whether the Framing-era understandings that Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch 
invoked were critically dependent on the technological limitations of the era, which effectively constrained the 
volume of information about the activities of an investigative target that could be obtained from third parties. 
Originalism, in short, offers no ready vehicle for selecting between the approach taken by the majority in 
Carpenter, and the approach taken by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch.  
 195. 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012). 
 196. 569 U.S. 1 (2013). 
 197. Id. at 5 (“When ‘the Government obtains information by physically intruding’ on persons, houses, 
papers, or effects, ‘a “search” within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment’ has ‘undoubtedly 
occurred.’” (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 n.3)). 
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support such a definition.198 Beyond that, the trespassory conduct in Jones and 
Jardines involved such minor intrusions that they might not have been regarded 
as problematic in the Framing era; Brian Sawers has demonstrated that in the 
Framing-era United States, the prevailing rule was that an unauthorized entry 
onto unfenced land of another was generally not regarded as an unlawful trespass 
absent damage to the property.199 Moreover, as we have seen, the searches and 
seizures of concern in the Framing era involved substantial force and coercion 
of a type entirely absent in the covert surveillance in Jones, or the limited 
intrusion at stake in Jardines, in which the information gleaned from the dog’s 
alert was far narrower than could be obtained by the type of forcible physical 
entry and physical search of concern in the Framing era.200 
It may be desirable to treat unauthorized physical intrusions to obtain 
information as searches subject to constitutional regulation under the Fourth 
Amendment; indeed, some scholars have argued that Jones and Jardines are best 
anchored not in original meaning but in a normative view regarding need to 
regulate governmental trespass.201 It is doubtful, however, that this conclusion 
can be fairly anchored in the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
4. Knock-and-Announce 
It is also striking how quickly even seemingly originalist doctrine lapses 
into nonoriginalism. Consider the knock-and-announce requirement for 
executing a search warrant derived from Framing-era common law and held to 
be an aspect of Fourth Amendment reasonableness in Wilson v. Arkansas.202 
Although Wilson was coded O, the subsequent cases in the study period applying 
the requirement addressed claims of exigent circumstances, and while 
mentioning the rule’s originalist origins, all were decided on nonoriginalist 




 198. For a helpful discussion of the inconclusive historical evidence regarding the Framing-era conception 
of a “search,” see Kerr, supra note 182, at 71–76.  
 199. Brian Sawers, Original Misunderstandings: The Implications of Misreading History in Jones, 31 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 471, 490–510 (2015). 
 200. For a more extensive argument along these lines, see Lawrence Rosenthal, Binary Searches and the 
Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 881, 919–25 (2014). 
 201. See, e.g., Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Andrew Tutt, Offensive Searches: Toward a Two-Tier Theory of 
Fourth Amendment Protection, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 116–20 (2017) (arguing that Jones and 
Jardines rest on protection of dignitarian interests infringed by governmental trespass); Laurent Sacharoff, 
Constitutional Trespass, 81 TENN. L. REV. 877, 917–20 (2014) (arguing that Jones and Jardines are best 
understood to rest on a common-law approach to trespass sensitive to evolving norms).  
 202. 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995). 
 203. See United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 33 (2003) (officers seeking cocaine acted reasonably in 
making forcible entry after announcing and waiting 15–20 seconds); United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 68 
(1998) (officers executing no-knock warrant for suspect believed to possess guns and drugs could break garage 
window to accomplish covert entry); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 388 (1997) (rejecting a blanket 
exception to knock-and-announce rule in drug cases but holding that the unannounced entry in the case at bar 
was properly premised on reasonable suspicion that Richards would destroy readily disposable drugs). 
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The root of this difficulty is found in Wilson itself; the Court acknowledged 
that “at the time of the framing, the common-law admonition that an officer 
‘ought to signify the cause of his coming,’ had not been extended conclusively 
to the context of felony arrests,” and only “gradually was applied to cases 
involving felonies, but at the same time the courts continued to recognize that 
under certain circumstances the presumption in favor of announcement 
necessarily would give way to contrary considerations.”204 Thus, Wilson 
acknowledged that the scope of the knock-and-announce requirement was 
unclear at the time of framing and ratification. This is yet another example of 
latent nonoriginalism, made evident by Wilson’s nonoriginalist progeny. 
Perhaps Wilson’s account of the Framing-era understanding should not be 
taken as accurate. Tracey Maclin has argued that the exceptions to the knock-
and-announce requirement were understood narrowly in the Framing era.205 
Even so, it is unclear whether the Framing-era view has fair application today; 
contemporary law enforcement faces exigencies little known in the Framing era. 
At the founding, the most common form of judicially-authorized search was a 
warrant to search for stolen goods.206 Today, officers frequently seek far more 
readily disposable evidence,207 and the development of efficient firearms means 
that officers executing warrants at present likely face far greater dangers than in 
the Framing era.208 
Thus, even if Wilson overstated the indeterminacy of the historical record, 
there is good reason to believe that the Framing-era conception of the knock-
and-announce requirement offers little useful guidance for judges addressing 
contemporary claims of exigency in an era of ubiquitous drug and gun crime. It 
should therefore be unsurprising that originalism has been of little use in 
determining the contemporary reach of the knock-and-announce requirement. 
 
 
 204. 514 U.S. at 935 (citation omitted) (quoting Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (Q.B. 1604)). 
 205. Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment 
History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 911–14 (2002). 
 206. E.g., Davies, supra note 121, at 16; Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evidence and the 
History of Private “Papers” as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 75–
76 (2013); Thomas, supra note 131, at 201. This remained the case even at the end of the nineteenth century. 
See Oliver, supra note 131, at 402 n.104. 
 207. Cf. Richards, 520 U.S. at 395–96 (holding that forcible entry into motel room to execute warrant to 
search for and seize drugs immediately after uniformed officers were observed by occupant was reasonable 
“given the disposable nature of the drugs”).  
 208. Cf. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 382 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[E]ven if a ‘frisk’ prior 
to arrest would have been considered impermissible in 1791, perhaps it was considered permissible by 1868, 
when the Fourteenth Amendment (the basis for applying the Fourth Amendment to the States) was adopted. Or 
perhaps it is only since that time that concealed weapons capable of harming the interrogator quickly and from 
beyond arm’s reach have become common—which might alter the judgment of what is ‘reasonable’ under the 
original standard.”). 
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IV.  ALTERNATIVES TO SCALLIAN ORIGINALISM 
An originalist might respond to this study by contending that Justice 
Scalia’s apparent inability to utilize originalist grounds of decision in the bulk 
of Fourth Amendment cases reflects the defects of his approach to originalism 
(and perhaps that of Justice Thomas as well). For example, originalist scholars 
sometimes accused Justice Scalia of applying original meaning only in rule-like 
form, rather than utilizing more abstract standards.209 This approach might be 
expected to be particularly problematic when it comes to the constitutional 
prohibition on “unreasonable” search and seizure. Others criticized Justice 
Scalia for his willingness to resort to nonoriginalist balancing when he could 
identify no Framing-era practice that reached the case before the Court.210 There 
are considerable difficulties, however, in developing an alternative to Scalian 
originalism that would be more helpful in deciding the cases in this study on 
originalist grounds. 
A. ANALOGY OR ADAPTATION 
Some scholars, recognizing the perils of applying Framing-era rules to 
contemporary circumstances, have argued that original meaning should not be 
utilized through appropriation of Framing-era rules, but instead by a process of 
analogical reasoning from historical precedent,211 or by adapting or “translating” 
original meaning in light of altered historical context.212 Even Justice Scalia 
indulged this approach on occasion; as we have seen, Kyllo rests on an effort to 
adapt the Fourth Amendment to technological change.213 Yet, as Kyllo’s 
contestable originalism demonstrates, analogical reasoning or adaptation 
presents considerable difficulties.214 Examples of these difficulties, beyond 
Kyllo itself, are plentiful. 
1. Warrantless Search and Seizure 
Consider once again the difficulties with identifying an originalist rule for 
when a search or seizure must be authorized by warrant. Those difficulties do 
not disappear with the use of analogy or adaptation. 
The seminal case upholding warrantless searches of vehicles was Carroll, 
in which, as we have seen, the Court drew an analogy between Framing-era 
customs searches of ships and contemporary searches of vehicles because both  
 
 
 209. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 41, at 11–12; Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a 
Law of Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483, 488–95 (2014). 
 210. See, e.g., Michael, supra note 91, at 918–19. 
 211. See, e.g., Strang, supra note 21, at 957 (arguing that originalists should utilize “analogy-warranting 
rationales” when considering the relevance of Framing-era practice to contemporary adjudication). 
 212. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 82, at 1189–211 (arguing that fidelity to original meaning requires efforts 
to adapt or “translate” original meaning in light of changes in historical context).  
 213. See supra text accompanying notes 62–64. 
 214. See supra Subpart III.C.2. 
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ships and vehicles are potentially mobile.215 Professor Davies rejected this 
analogy, contending that customs searches of ships were not addressed by the 
Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable search and seizure of only 
“persons, houses, papers, and effects,” adding that in the Framing era, ships 
“were not ordinary property at common law, but personalities subject to 
admiralty law—a branch of civil law.”216 A customs inspection of a vessel’s 
cargo, however, would seem to involve a search and seizure of “effects” within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the text of which contains no exception 
for search and seizure governed by admiralty law. But, even if this objection to 
Carroll’s reasoning is set aside, the soundness of its analogy between ships and 
vehicles, based on the potential mobility of each, is open to serious question. 
As we have seen, we lack reliable historical evidence demonstrating that in 
the Framing-era, other types of potentially mobile property, such as carts or 
carriages, could be searched without a warrant.217 Moreover, in the Framing-era, 
not only the “effects” found on potentially mobile ships, but also those found on 
quite immobile commercial premises, could be searched without a warrant on 
the view that there were the special governmental interests in facilitating 
enforcement of customs, tax, and other regulatory laws at these locations.218 
When these interests were at stake, there is Framing-era precedent for dispensing 
with more than a warrant; the first Congress authorized not only customs 
officials to board and inspect vessels, but also tax officials to enter and search 
distilleries, without requiring warrants, probable cause, or even individualized 
suspicion.219 Perhaps the particular governmental interests at stake in revenue 
collection, rather than potential mobility, explain the Framing-era willingness to 
dispense with a warrant in contexts involving revenue collection.220 
Thus, an effort to utilize Framing-era customs searches of ships to lend 
support for warrantless searches of automobiles based on the mobility of each is 
imperfect; we cannot be confident that mobility was central to the Framing-era 
tolerance for warrantless search and seizure. Yet, once this effort to equate 
Framing-era customs searches and contemporary searches of vehicles is called  
 
 
 215. See supra text accompanying notes 47–48, 184. 
 216. Davies, supra note 80, at 605–06 & n.151. 
 217. See supra text accompanying note 187. 
 218. See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 71, at 743–46; Davies, supra note 80, at 604–08.  
 219. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. 
L. REV. 53, 59 (1996); Arcila, supra note 121, at 1299–311; Louis Fisher, Congress and the Fourth Amendment, 
21 GA. L. REV. 107, 112–15 (1986); cf. Cloud, supra note 119, at 1739–43 (arguing that these Framing-era 
precedents were limited to regulatory contexts); Maclin, supra note 128, at 950–55 (same). See generally United 
States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 583–84 (1983) (discussing the decision of the first Congress to 
authorize inspections of vessels under the Fourth Amendment). 
 220. Cf. Davies, supra note 121, at 30–31 (“Revenue searches differed from criminal searches in two 
important respects. First, because revenue was essential to the survival of the government, and thus an essential 
public good, revenue searches likely were regarded as being more important . . . . Second, revenue enforcement 
could not rely upon victim complaints to initiate prosecutions, as criminal justice did.”). 
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into question, there is little evidence of any historically-fixed original meaning 
of a “reasonable” search and seizure that provides an originalist understanding 
of whether warrants are required to search vehicles or other potentially moveable 
property. 
2. Exclusion 
The same problem infects efforts to apply Framing-era conceptions to the 
question of what remedy should be offered when evidence is obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. As we have seen, the Framing-era regime 
of tort liability may present unacceptable risks of over-deterrence in light of the 
demands placed on contemporary law enforcement, and therefore seems ill-
suited for the present.221 Yet, contemporary tort remedies may be too 
circumscribed to deter unreasonable search and seizure effectively; indeed, the 
Supreme Court’s embrace of the exclusionary rule was based primarily on its 
assessment that experience had demonstrated that damages remedies had proven 
ineffective.222 
Lawrence Lessig has argued that the exclusionary rule is now justified as a 
faithful application of Framing-era principles in light of the inadequacy of 
contemporary tort remedies.223 In contrast, Akhil Amar, while recognizing the 
difficulties with the Framing-era regime and the threat of over-deterrence, 
nevertheless opposed exclusion because of the lack of any Framing-era 
precedent for a remedy that protects the guilty, and argued instead for a reformed 
system of civil liability, including government-entity liability, class actions, 
punitive damages, and injunctions against police misconduct.224 There are, 
however, reasons to be skeptical of the efficacy of these proposals; injunctive 
decrees enforced by contempt sanctions against individual officials might 
produce over-deterrence, and government-entity liability might have limited 
deterrent effects on individual officers and perverse effects on government 
budgets.225 
However, one might assess the competing remedial regimes advanced by 
Professors Lessig and Amar, the key point for present purposes is that this debate 
cannot be resolved by reference to the original meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. After all, the Framing-era regime of robust personal tort liability 
was utilized when there was no fair equivalent to modern police forces expected 
to take proactive measures to keep the peace and investigate crime. There is no 
obvious way to analogize or adapt this Framing-era regime to the present, when 
many will regard it as critical that the threat of damages liability or other 
sanctions does not unduly deter officers. The question whether exclusion has 
become justifiable, despite the benefits it confers on the guilty, in light of the  
 
 
 221. See supra Subpart III.A.3. 
 222. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650–57 (1961). 
 223. Lessig, supra note 82, at 1228–33. 
 224. AMAR, supra note 127, at 29–31, 40–43. 
 225. For a more elaborate discussion of these issues, see Rosenthal, supra note 148, at 558–60, 565–68.  
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contemporary defects of the Framing-era regime personal tort liability and the 
difficulties that inhere in alternative regimes of civil remedies cannot be 
answered by mere reference to the original meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.226 
3. School and Other Special-Needs Searches 
Similarly, consider again searches of public school students and other cases 
involving special-needs searches. This is another Fourth Amendment problem 
that does not readily yield to analogy or adaptation. 
As we have seen, Justice Thomas once suggested an originalist approach 
to school searches through the use of analogy, arguing that the Framing-era rule 
of in loco parentis should be incorporated in the Fourth Amendment’s 
conception of reasonableness, while Justice Scalia resisted this approach, noting 
the advent of contemporary compulsory school attendance laws.227 There are 
indeed formidable difficulties in analogizing between the Framing-era authority 
of schools and contemporary public education. 
When the relationship between parents and schools was entirely 
contractual, a delegation of parental authority to school officials had substance, 
and the exercise of that delegated authority by school officials to search students 
in their care could plausibly be regarded as reasonable within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. When the relationship between parents and public schools 
becomes largely a creature of statute, however, the fairness of any comparison 
between an actual Framing-era contractual delegation of parental authority and 
a contemporary implied-in-law statutory delegation, regardless of the parent’s 
individual wishes—or her ability to finance an alternative education at a private 
school—is doubtful. But, if one is persuaded that any effort to analogize to or 
adapt the Framing-era concept of in loco parentis to contemporary school 
searches is misguided, there does not seem to be any other Framing-era 
conception that offers a better candidate for analogy or adaptation when it comes 
to school searches. Nonoriginalism seems inevitable. 
Other special-needs cases in this study also involve issues with no obvious 
Framing-era antecedent, as we have seen.228 In these cases as well, no obvious 
method analogy or adaptation present themselves. 
 
 226. Cf. Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?) Demise of Criminal Procedure 
Liberalism, 107 YALE L.J. 2281, 2299 (1998) (reviewing AMAR, supra note 127) (“[T]he argument about the 
relative merits of the exclusionary rule and civil damages, like the argument about the warrant requirement, must 
rest on judgments about systemic deterrence. What method of enforcement is most likely to make the ‘people . . . 
secure’ from the threat of unreasonable searches and seizures at the least cost? Viewed in this way, the 
exclusionary rule doubtless has problems, but there is once again more to say in its favor than Amar supposes.”). 
 227. See supra text accompanying notes 155–159. 
 228. See supra Subpart III.B.2. 
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4. Cellphone Searches 
Consider as well the question whether the digital contents of a modern 
cellphone can be inspected as part of a search incident to an arrest. As we have 
seen, although Riley discussed the historical basis for the search-incident-to-
arrest doctrine, its holding was grounded in a nonoriginalist balancing test.229 
One might argue, however, that rummaging through the digital contents of a 
cellphone is the modern equivalent of a general search condemned under the 
original meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This comparison, however, is 
dubious. As Justice Scalia once noted, a search incident to a lawful arrest 
importantly differs from a general search: “The fact of prior lawful arrest 
distinguishes the arrestee from society at large, and distinguishes a search for 
evidence of his crime from general rummaging.”230 Perhaps an arrest should not 
be a sufficient basis for searching the contents of the arrestee’s cellphone, but 
surely not because such a search is equivalent to the issuance of a general 
warrant, unsupported by any particularized showing of wrongdoing. 
One might also try to compare the search of a cellphone’s contents to a 
search and seizure of “private papers,” which was condemned under the 
Framing-era view that such searches infringed property rights.231 It is, however, 
unclear that what came to be known as the “mere evidence” rule,232 is properly 
assimilated within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment; the 
Amendment’s text contains no absolute prohibition on the search or seizure of 
persons, houses, papers or effects, but only a rule against their “unreasonable” 
search and seizure.233 In any event, the mere evidence rule seems not to have 
limited searches incident to a valid arrest in the Framing era. Under Framing-era 
law, items in the possession of an arrestee were subject to search,234 and there is 
no indication that this rule did not reach papers in an arrestee’s possession.235 
Thus, although there may be good reason to condemn warrantless inspection of 
the digital contents of a cellphone incident to arrest, a plausible rationale for that 
conclusion is not found by simple analogy to or adaptation of the Framing-era  
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presumably, could be described in a search warrant”). 
 234. See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 71, at 751–53; TAYLOR, supra note 126, at 27–29, 39–46; Thomas, 
supra note 166, at 1474–75.  
 235. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 206, at 108 (“There is, moreover, a powerful argument that the original 
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conception of unreasonable search and seizure.236 
5. Stop and Frisk 
Or, consider Terry. As we have seen, Framing-era law did not recognize 
authority to stop and frisk a suspect on suspicion, but often permitted a full 
custodial arrest on suspicion under the night-walker statutes and their like.237 
Today, reliance on Framing-era arrest authority is perilous. As we have seen, the 
standard of probable cause has evolved in a way that more clearly distinguishes 
it from suspicion,238 officers face a greatly reduced risk of personal liability in 
tort,239 and statutes authorizing arrest on suspicion are now considered 
impermissibly vague, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.240 How to 
properly analogize or adapt the Framing-era conception of authority to detain 
suspicious persons to contemporary search and seizure is far from clear.241 
6. Jones 
As the preceding examples illustrate, the basic problem with an effort to 
apply Framing-era understandings to far different contemporary search and 
seizure controversies is the dubious nature of the entire enterprise. There is great 
danger, as Stephen Griffin has observed, when “originalism depends on using 
history without historicism, the use of evidence from the past without paying 
attention to historical context.”242 When one gives proper attention to context, 
however, there may be no reliable means for analogizing or adapting Framing-
era understandings in a vastly different historical context.243 The past does not 
 
 236. Cf. id. at 108–09 (arguing for limitations on searches of digital evidence incident to arrest based on an 
“anti-rummaging norm” resolving “the tension between Founding-era respect for papers and Founding-era 
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This uncertainty persisted through the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. See, e.g., 1 BISHOP, 
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sometimes; some cases are undeniably identical in all conceivably relevant respects to previously decided cases. 
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always contain neat parallels to the present.244 
Justice Scalia, for one, grasped this point. In Jones, in response to Justice 
Scalia’s reasoning that the attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle and its 
subsequent monitoring was a “search” within the original meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment because, in the Framing-era, any physical occupation of the 
property of another was regarded as a trespass,245 Justice Alito wrote: “[I]t is 
almost impossible to think of late-18th-century situations that are analogous to 
what took place in this case,” such as when “a constable secreted himself 
somewhere in a coach and remained there for a period of time in order to monitor 
the movements of the coach’s owner,” which “would have required either a 
gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or both.”246 It is hard to disagree. Indeed, 
Justice Scalia responded: “[I]t is quite irrelevant whether there was an 18th-
century analog.”247 That conclusion seems inescapable for an originalist, at least 
absent evidence that some methodology for conducting analogical reasoning or 
adaptation was somehow baked into the original meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
B. DEFAULT RULES 
Given the difficulties of applying Framing-era understandings to 
contemporary litigation, one might be tempted to embrace a default rule. Some 
originalist scholars, for example, argue that in light of the importance of 
representative government to the constitutional structure, challenged legislative 
or executive action should be presumed constitutional.248 Others, in contrast, 
argue that the constitutional scheme’s regard for liberty justifies a presumption 
in its favor and against the government.249 Since the Constitution contains no 
text prescribing a rule for its interpretation, however, it is difficult to root any 
type of default rule in original meaning.250 It is even more difficult to identify a 
default rule lurking within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.251 
 
But when they are merely ‘analogous,’ there is no metric of similarity that will enable a later case to be decided 
by reference to a former one, just as there is no metric of similarity that would have enabled Lyndon Johnson to 
figure out whether abandoning South Vietnam to her fate would have been ‘another Munich.’”). 
 244. For a useful discussion of the difficulties in adapting original meaning to changed circumstances, see 
Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 398–412 (1997).  
 245. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–11 (2012). 
 246. Id. at 420 & n.3 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 247. Id. at 406 n.3 (majority opinion).  
 248. See, e.g., Calabresi & Fine, supra note 21, at 699; Graglia, supra note 8, at 1044; Gary Lawson, Dead 
Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1234–35 (2012); Paulsen, supra note 7, at 2057. 
 249. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 7, at 255–71; Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Sex, Lies, and Jurisprudence: 
Robert Bork, Griswold and the Philosophy of Original Understanding, 24 GA. L. REV. 1045, 1070–76 (1990). 
 250. To be sure, a default rule might be characterized as originalist if it reflected the original methods used 
to interpret the Constitution. Indeed, some have defended something like a presumption of constitutionality as 
reflecting the Framing-era approach to judicial review, although a comprehensive survey of Framing-era 
jurisprudence casts considerable doubt on this view. See William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before 
Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 560–62 (2005). 
 251. For a more general argument against the originalist credentials of default rules, see Solum, supra note 
14, at 511–23. 
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Because the Fourth Amendment is a limitation on governmental powers, it 
is hard to characterize it as reflecting some form of default in favor of legislative 
or executive action.252 To be sure, the Fourth Amendment only prohibits 
“unreasonable” search and seizure, but this is no default rule; it is a function of 
the unadorned text, making no use of historical evidence of original meaning. 
One could imagine a default rule limited to a proscription against search 
and seizures of the type understood to be forbidden in the Framing era. For 
example, some originalists have argued that because, in the Framing era, 
concerns about search and seizure were largely confined to searches of 
residences pursuant to inadequately particularized warrants, a contemporary 
Fourth Amendment should parallel that concern, without other types of search 
and seizure left unregulated.253 In the Framing era, however, officers acting 
without warrants had much less authority and much greater exposure to tort 
liability than at present.254 Thus, it is problematic to limit Fourth Amendment 
protections to only those practices thought unreasonable in a different historical 
context.255 
Confining the Fourth Amendment to a prohibition on general warrants not 
only produces a prohibition narrower than reflected in the ratified text, but it also 
neglects the possibility that the Fourth Amendment is not properly read to be 
inapplicable to regimes of search and seizure that the Framing generation might 
not have anticipated.256 Indeed, because constitutional text is generally framed 
more broadly than its original expected applications, most originalists draw a 
distinction between the original meaning of constitutional text and its original 
expected applications, and regard only the former as interpretively binding.257 
 
 252. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very purpose of a Bill 
of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond 
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”). 
 253. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, The Constitutional Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 
817, 833–55 (1989) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment is confined to a prohibition on general warrants); David 
E. Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1083–
95 (2004) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment prevents only entry of houses with a general warrant or no 
warrant). 
 254. See supra text accompanying notes 122–142.  
 255. For a more elaborate argument along these lines, see Davies, supra note 80, at 740–44. 
 256. See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 71, at 772 (“Having uprooted the paramount cause of the incidents of 
unreasonable search and seizure with which they were familiar, the generation of the Fourth Amendment had 
little reason to foresee that devices other than the general warrant would someday imperil the right they sought 
to protect.”); Davies, supra note 80, at 552 (“The modern interpretation of ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ 
is the product of post-framing developments that the Framers did not anticipate. During the nineteenth century, 
courts and legislatures responded to heightened concerns about crime and disorder by expanding peace officers’ 
ex officio authority to arrest and search. That expansion marginalized warrant authority and thus undercut the 
premises that had led the Framers to believe that they could control the officer by controlling the warrant.”).  
 257. BALKIN, supra note 7, at 6–14; Barnett, supra note 21, at 410; Berman, supra note 86, at 385–89; 
Calabresi & Fine, supra note 21, at 668–72; Green, supra note 86, at 580–82; McConnell, supra note 7, at 1284–
87; Paulsen, supra note 7, at 2059–62; Rotunda, supra note 7, at 513–14; Ryan, supra note 86, at 1539–46; 
Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 935 (2009). For 
examples of Justice Scalia’s embrace of this approach, see supra text accompanying notes 82–90. 
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The original expected application of the Fourth Amendment may have been 
confined to general warrants and their like, but its text is inconsistent with the 
conclusion that only a general warrant could produce “unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”258 
Conversely, given that the Fourth Amendment prohibits only 
“unreasonable” search and seizure, it is equally hard to characterize the Fourth 
Amendment as reflecting a presumption against the constitutionality of any type 
of search or seizure not endorsed by Framing-era practice. This view neglects 
the possibility that new demands on law enforcement might render reasonable 
methods regarded as unreasonable in the Framing era; for example, as we have 
seen, the development of efficient firearms might bolster the case for the 
reasonableness of investigative stop and frisk.259 
In short, no default rule looks very promising as an originalist approach to 
the Fourth Amendment.260 
C. ORIGINAL MEANING AT HIGHER LEVELS OF GENERALITY 
Another originalist response to the difficulties of applying historical 
evidence of original meaning to contemporary issues of search and seizure law 
is to state original meaning at a sufficiently high level of generality. 
Many originalists argue that original meaning should be stated at the level 




 258. Cf. JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 99–124 (2005) (arguing that when a constitutional provision is directed at a paradigmatic evil, it should be 
understood as a commitment to prohibit the evil that gave it rise, without precluding an interpretation that 
proscribes additional practices within the ambit of the text).  
 259. See supra text accompanying note 169. 
 260. A type of originalist default rule is suggested by Michael Mannheimer’s view that in light of the 
character of the antifederalist objections to the original Constitution that produced the Fourth Amendment, it 
should be understood to require simply that federal officials comply with state law when undertaking search and 
seizure. Mannheimer, supra note 91, at 1263–87. It is unclear, however, whether this rule qualifies as originalist; 
it hardly seems likely that the Fourth Amendment’s original meaning would have required federal officials to 
obey a state law that prohibited them from undertaking inspections or searches to enforce federal customs or tax 
laws. Indeed, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court found the evidence that the Fourth Amendment 
was understood in the Framing era to require compliance with state law inconclusive. See Virginia v. Moore, 
553 U.S. 164, 168–71 (2008). Professor Mannheimer acknowledges the indeterminacy of the historical evidence 
and defends his proposal as an instance where “constitutional interpretation must give way to constitutional 
construction, ‘and the meaning of the text must be determined rather than found.’” Mannheimer, supra note 91, 
at 1285 (quoting BARNETT, supra note 7, at 120). For that reason, his proposal more likely reflects nonoriginalist 
construction than fixation and constraint. Moreover, if the Fourth Amendment is deemed applicable to search 
and seizure by state and local officials by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no evidence that the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment required only that state or local officials comply with state law, 
and Professor Mannheimer advances no such argument. See id. at 1234 n.6. The historical evidence of the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, as we have seen, offers little support for the view that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did no more than require that search and seizure be undertaken in compliance with 
applicable state law. See supra note 154.  
 261. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 7, at 12–63; BORK, supra note 9, at 149; Barnett, supra note 41, at 23; 
McConnell, supra note 7, at 1280.  
December 2018]     AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY INTO THE USE OF ORIGINALISM 131 
   
of the level of generality reflected in the prohibition on “unreasonable searches 
and seizures,” the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment could properly be 
stated at quite a high level of generality.262 Indeed, some originalists have 
approached the Fourth Amendment in this way, arguing that its original meaning 
is properly stated in terms of a concern about excessive discretion exercised by 
law enforcement officials,263 unwarranted governmental intrusions,264 undue 
threats to individual liberty and privacy,265 reasonableness,266 individualized 
suspicion,267 or as one scholar put it, combining related themes, “preserving 
judicial oversight, constraining discretion, and sacrificing individual privacy 
only to the extent necessary.”268 
Stating original meaning at such a high level of generality, however, is 
inevitably reductive; one cannot generalize about original meaning without 
losing important qualifications reflected in the historical evidence.269 For 
example, characterizing the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment in terms 
of excessive discretion overlooks the fact that both the night-walker laws and 
warrantless inspections of ships and commercial premises involved a good deal 
of enforcement discretion, and seem to have been regarded as within the original 
ambit of lawful search-and-seizure authority.270 Stating original meaning in 
terms of “reasonableness” overlooks the fact that Framing-era law never 
employed a test for search and seizure framed in those terms, but instead asked 
whether an official sued in tort had acted within the scope of his lawful duties.271 
 
 262. For a general discussion of the difficulties originalists face when endeavoring to select the appropriate 
level of generality at which to state the original meaning of constitutional text, see Peter J. Smith, Originalism 
and Level of Generality, 51 GA. L. REV. 485, 532–49 (2017). 
 263. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69–73 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Michael, 
supra note 91, at 919–22. 
 264. See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 231, at 350–66; Donohue, supra note 79, at 1314–28. 
 265. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 119, at 1128–30; Thomas, supra note 166, at 1463–78. 
 266. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 127, at 10–20. 
 267. See, e.g., TASLITZ, supra note 128, at 45–54; Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion 
in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 526–31 (1995). 
 268. SCHULHOFER, supra note 126, at 177. To similar effect, see GRAY, supra note 78, at 168 (“Most 
founding-era readers would have read the reasonableness clause as commanding future governments not to 
injure or infringe upon the collective right of the people to live free from fear that their living spaces would be 
explored, their written and printed materials looked through or taken, their personal property examined or 
taken, and their persons sought, examined, or restrained for no reason, for insufficient reasons, for illegitimate 
reasons, or based solely on the unfettered discretion of executive agents acting beyond the reach of effective 
judicial constraint or review.”). 
 269. Cf. Davies, supra note 80, at 745 (“[E]xtracting any ‘principle’ from a text that was written within the 
larger structure of common-law concepts and doctrines is inherently reductionist . . . .”); Graglia, supra note 8, 
at 1044 (“Originalism cannot realistically be said to restrain judges if it requires no more than that they be able 
to identify a principle or ‘value’ the ratifiers wanted to protect. Many principles or values are protected by the 
Constitution, and they necessarily come into conflict. None of them is or can be protected absolutely.”). 
 270. See supra text accompanying notes 167–168, 217–220. 
 271. See, e.g., Arcila, supra note 134, at 394–423; Cloud, supra note 119, at 1732–43; Davies, supra note 
80, at 571–90; Donohue, supra note 79, at 1185–92; David E. Steinberg, The Uses and Misuses of Fourth 
Amendment History, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581, 586–94 (2008); Nikolaus Williams, Note, The Supreme Court’s 
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A focus on individualized suspicion overlooks the fact that the Framing-era 
conception permitted suspicionless search and seizure when governmental 
interests regarded as particularly strong were at stake, as in the case of searches 
of ships, distilleries, and other commercial premises.272 
Even more important, when original meaning is stated in terms of relatively 
general standards, original meaning ceases to do much, if any, analytical work. 
If original meaning is characterized in terms of excessive discretion, undue 
intrusion or threat to liberty or privacy, or simply reasonableness, then any 
distinction between original and contemporary meaning becomes of little 
significance. Instead, a prudential judgment is required about whether, under 
contemporary circumstances, there is adequate justification for whatever level 
of discretion, intrusion, or limitation on liberty or privacy is at stake. When 
original meaning is stated so capaciously, the distinction between originalism 
and nonoriginalism becomes vanishingly small. Constitutional adjudication is 
instead driven by a contemporary assessment of the costs and benefits of search 
and seizure.273 
Thus, once one divorces the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
from Framing-era practice, the difference between originalism and 
nonoriginalism seems to disappear. If one simply defines original meaning as a 
prohibition on “unreasonable” search and seizure without tying reasonableness 
to Framing-era practice, one winds up reading the Fourth Amendment in 
contemporary terms, without need of original meaning. For example, consider 
again Wilson’s originalist justification for a knock-and-announce requirement. 
If evidence of Framing-era practice is not dispositive, then one wonders what 
originalism adds to the case for a Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce 
requirement. One hardly needs historical evidence of original meaning to 
conclude that an unannounced forcible entry without some rational justification 
is “unreasonable;” without justification, a forcible entry produces unnecessary 
property damage and an unwarranted risk of violent confrontation.274 Thus, 
stating original meaning at a high level of generality is likely of little aid when 
addressing disputed questions of Fourth Amendment law. Perhaps the reason 




Ahistorical Reasonableness Approach to the Fourth Amendment, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1522, 1535–54 (2014).  
 272. See supra text accompanying notes 217–220. 
 273. For helpful, if more general, discussions of the way originalists, by stating original meaning at a high 
level of generality, collapse the distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism, see Segall, supra note 13, 
at 432–33; and Smith, supra note 262, at 549–56. 
 274. Cf. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460–61 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Many home-
owners in this crime-beset city doubtless are armed. When a woman sees a strange man, in plain clothes, prying 
up her bedroom window and climbing in, her natural impulse would be to shoot. A plea of justifiable homicide 
might result awkwardly for enforcement officers. But an officer seeing a gun being drawn on him might shoot 
first. Under the circumstances of this case, I should not want the task of convincing a jury that it was not murder. 
I have no reluctance in condemning as unconstitutional a method of law enforcement so reckless and so fraught 
with danger and discredit to the law enforcement agencies themselves.”). 
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stated at a high level of generality, offered little help when it came to deciding 
the cases before him. 
CONCLUSION 
In his extrajudicial writing, Justice Scalia sometimes advanced what he 
seemed to regard as the originalist clincher: “The conclusive argument in favor 
of originalism,” he wrote (with a co-author), is that “[i]t is the only objective 
standard of interpretation even competing for acceptance.”275 Or, as he put it on 
another occasion: “You can’t beat somebody with nobody.”276 In this regard, 
Justice Scalia might have been a bit uncharitable; scholars have offered a variety 
of approaches to constitutional adjudication beyond original meaning that offer 
some hope of objectivity.277 In any event, this study suggests that nonoriginalism 
is inescapable; original meaning simply does not provide an answer in most 
cases before the Supreme Court, at least when it comes to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Some alternative to originalism is essential if the Court is to do 
its work. Originalism likely offers meaningful guidance in only a small fraction 
of the kind of the cases that reach the Supreme Court. 
One might believe, however, that the Fourth Amendment presents unusual 
difficulties for originalism. Perhaps it is framed at an unusually high level of 
generality, or the historical evidence of its original meaning is unusually 
indeterminate, that therefore this study has produced results not generalizable to 
other areas of constitutional law. There is, however, reason to think that the 
Fourth Amendment is typical of the kind of constitutional provisions likely to 
come before the Supreme Court. 
Highly determinate text is unlikely to generate litigation; no one needs a 
court to decide whether a teenager can serve in the House of Representatives.278 
Open-ended constitutional text is more likely to produce litigation, and in this 
respect, the Fourth Amendment is hardly unique. As Thomas Colby put it: “Our 
Constitution . . . with its short list of lofty guarantees like ‘equal protection of 
the laws,’ ‘freedom of speech,’ and ‘due process of law’—is objectively open-
ended in many instances.”279 Thus, the Fourth Amendment may be typical of 
 
 275. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 25, at 89.  
 276. Scalia, supra note 8, at 855. 
 277. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11–22 (1991) (describing textual, 
historical, ethical, structural, prudential, and doctrinal arguments); Jack M. Balkin, Arguing About the 
Constitution: The Topics in Constitutional Interpretation, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 145, 182–85 (2018) (describing 
arguments from text, structure, purposes, consequences, judicial precedent, political convention, customs, 
natural law or rights, national ethos, political tradition, and honored authority); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A 
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194–209 (1987) 
(describing arguments from text, the Framers’ intent, constitutional theory, precedent, and values or policies). 
 278. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to 
the Age of twenty five Years . . . .”). 
 279. Colby, supra note 13, at 725 (footnotes omitted); accord, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Philosophy of 
Language, Linguistics, and Possible Lessons about Originalism, in THE NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: 
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“the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights.”280 Open-ended text, however, 
will often lack anything like a crystal-clear original meaning; for example, there 
is something approaching consensus among legal scholars that the original 
meaning of the First Amendment’s protection for freedom of speech is 
unclear.281 
There is also reason to believe that the difficulties in applying historical 
evidence of the Fourth Amendment’s original meaning are typical. As we have 
seen, the original semantic meaning of the Constitution’s text may not often 
differ from its contemporary meaning; the English language has not changed 
markedly since the Constitution’s framing.282 Accordingly, as reflected in 
Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment originalism, original meaning often must be 
derived not by recovering archaic definitions of the words in the Constitution, 
but instead from evidence of the historical context in which the Constitution’s 
text was framed and understood.283 Yet, as reflected in the difficulties that 
Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment originalism encountered, applying 
contextual evidence of original meaning, divorced from its historical context, 
presents great difficulties. Original meaning rarely has a neat and tidy 
application to the issues that arise in contemporary litigation. 
Consider what may be the leading instance in which originalists claim that 
the nonoriginalist jurisprudence has departed from original meaning—the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Many have argued that the Supreme Court erred by 
 
WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL INTERPRETATION FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY 46, 63 (Brian 
G. Slocum ed., 2017) (“Many key constitutional provisions are cast in highly open-ended language; that in itself 
can greatly influence how far the text will provide answers to specific circumstances.”). For an effort by two 
leading originalist scholars to demonstrate that the Constitution contains many relatively open-ended standards 
beyond the Fourth Amendment, see Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 209, at 496–504. 
 280. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). 
 281. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (1941) (“The framers of the First 
Amendment make it plain that they regarded freedom of speech as very important . . . . But they say very little 
about its exact meaning.”); LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 281 (1985) (“[W]e do not know 
what the First Amendment’s freedom of speech-and-press clause meant to the men who drafted and ratified it at 
the time that they did so. Moreover, they [were] themselves at that time sharply divided and possessed no distinct 
understanding either.”); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS IN AMERICA 23 (1991) (“[I]t is simply impossible to turn to discussions by the framers . . . for definitive 
answers on the scope of freedom of the press.”); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN 
WARTIME 42 (2004) (“[T]he framers of the First Amendment . . . . embraced a broad and largely undefined 
constitutional principle, not a concrete, well-settled legal doctrine.”); STRAUSS, supra note 13, at 52 (“[T]he 
actual views of the drafters and ratifiers of the First Amendment are in many ways unclear.”); Lillian R. BeVier, 
The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. 
REV. 299, 307 (1978) (“History tells us little . . . about the precise meaning contemplated by those who drafted 
the Bill of Rights.”); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 
22 (1971) (“The framers seem to have had no coherent theory of free speech . . . .”); Jud Campbell, Natural 
Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 307 (2017) (“[I]t remains debatable whether the Speech 
and Press Clauses directly recognized ordinary natural rights, a set of more determinate legal rights, or both.”); 
Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of 
Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 26 (2011) (“[T]he evidence regarding the original meaning of the Speech and Press 
Clauses is anything but easy to sort out.”). 
 282. See supra text accompanying note 70.  
 283. See supra text accompanying notes 72–77. 
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incorporating provisions of the Bill of Rights within the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause,284 claiming instead that the original meaning 
of its Privileges or Immunities Clause285 protected the individual rights 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, and perhaps other rights regarded as 
fundamental, against abridgement by the states.286 There is also, however, 
substantial historical evidence that the original understanding of due process 
included protection for substantive, if unenumerated, rights that were regarded 
as fundamental.287 In any event, an originalist approach to the Fourteenth  
 
 
 284. For opinions making the case against due process incorporation, see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 
U.S. 742, 810–12 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part); and Adamson 
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63–66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 285. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”). 
 286. See AMAR, supra note 154, at 163–80 (fundamental rights including the Bill of Rights); CHESTER 
JAMES ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 56–67, 85–89 (1997) (same); 
BALKIN, supra note 7, at 190–219 (same); BARNETT, supra note 7, at 60–68, 326–37 (unjustified infringements 
on liberty); JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 251–63 (1997) (fundamental rights); KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 277–300 (2014) (enumerated personal 
constitutional rights); Richard L. Aynes, Ink Blot or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1295, 1309–24 (2009) (fundamental rights including the Bill of Rights); Michael Kent Curtis, 
Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United 
States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1145–51 (2000) (same); Douglas G. Smith, Natural Law, Article IV, and Section 
One of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 351, 395–417 (1997) (natural and common-law rights); 
Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original Understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1866–67, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1509, 1583–620 (2007) (protecting at least the Bill of Rights). To be 
sure, the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated substantive rights such as the Bill of Rights is not 
unassailable; the evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment was widely understood in the Framing era to impose 
the Bill of Rights against the states is thin and its ratification produced no discernable movement toward 
imposing the Bill of Rights against the States. See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment 
Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 68–134 (1949); Lawrence 
Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth Amendment: Original Public Meaning and the Problem 
of Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 361, 385–400 (2009); see also Philip Hamburger, Privileges or 
Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61, 122–34 (2011) (finding the evidence ambiguous). 
 287. See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of 
Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 324–38 (1999) (discussing the meaning of due process 
and explaining why “due process” refers to a “more encompassing protection of personal liberty”); Frederick 
Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law 
Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 654–63 (2009) (finding historical evidence 
that supports a broad substantive understanding of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Robert E. 
Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941, 943–63 (1990) (same); Ryan C. Williams, The 
One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE. L.J. 408, 460–90 (2010) (“Modern scholars who 
have surveyed the pre-Civil War case law for themselves have almost uniformly concluded that support for 
substantive due process in the antebellum era was far stronger than . . . critics of the doctrine had 
acknowledged.”). But cf. Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 
121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012) (arguing that due process prevented the legislature from exercising judicial powers 
or abrogating common-law procedural protections). 
136  HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:75 
Amendment might protect only the specific “due process” rights or “privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States” recognized as fundamental at the 
time of framing and ratification.288 The Fourteenth Amendment’s text, however, 
is written at a higher level of generality; freezing “due process” and “privileges 
or immunities” as of 1868 may well amount to no more than preserving the 
original expected applications of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the 
original meaning of its open-ended text. Once original expected applications are 
rejected as the basis for constitutional adjudication, however, all the 
disagreements about identifying and protecting fundamental rights in a 
contemporary context—such as those confronted by the Court in 
Obergefell289—reemerge in originalist garb, even if Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence were reformed along originalist lines.290 Originalism, in short, 
may be no more determinate for the Fourteenth Amendment than the Fourth. 
Of course, despite the foregoing, it is possible that some version of Fourth 
Amendment originalism might be devised that offers greater determinacy than 
the approaches considered above, or that the Fourth Amendment is atypical, and 
that original meaning could prove more useful in addressing the kind of cases 
that reach the Supreme Court under other constitutional provisions. This, 
however, is ultimately an empirical question. If originalists are serious about the 
theorized virtues of their preferred adjudicative methodology, it is time they 
undertook the empirical work necessary to prove themselves right, not by 
discussing their favorite, cherry-picked cases, but by demonstrating that 
originalism is a practicable method of constitutional adjudication in the broad 
range of cases. 
In a published tribute to the jurist he later replaced, Justice Scalia’s 
successor endorsed originalism, writing that judges should “strive (if humanly 
and so imperfectly) to apply the law as it is, focusing backward, not forward.”291 
This study suggests that if judges only look backward, searching for original 
meaning, they may not be able to do their jobs. 
  
 
 288. For an example of this approach, see generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997). 
 289. See supra text accompanying notes 1–3. 
 290. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Jackson, Be Careful What You Wish For: Why McDonald v. City of Chicago’s 
Rejection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause May Not Be Such a Bad Thing for Rights, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 
561, 591 (2011) (“[T]he Privileges or Immunities Clause provides no more real guidance to its use than . . . 
the Due Process Clause. In fact, if the best that can be said of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is that its 
protection is limited to ‘fundamental rights,’ then it sounds suspiciously like the Court’s interpretation of 
the Due Process Clause.”); cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Bagley, Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, 
70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 648 (2016) (advancing an originalist argument against the constitutionality of bans on 
same-sex marriage). 
 291. Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of Justice Scalia, 66 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 906 (2016). 
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APPENDIX  
Case Code Comments 
Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 
479 U.S. 367 
Majority: (Rehnquist, White, 












Dissent: (Marshall, Brennan) NO 
 
 
Maryland v. Garrison (1987) 
480 U.S. 79 
Majority: (Stevens, Rehnquist, 
White, Powell, O’Connor, 
Scalia) 
NOBOMC 
Coded primary issue: whether the execution of 
the warrant violated respondent's constitutional 
right to be secure in his home. 
Dissent: (Blackmun, Brennan, 
Marshall) 
NOBOMC 
Coded primary issue: whether the execution of 
the warrant violated respondent's constitutional 
right to be secure in his home. 
United States v. Dunn (1987) 
480 U.S. 294 
Majority: (White, Rehnquist, 
Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, 
O’Connor, Scalia [all but 
paragraph 3 of part II].) 
O 
Makes reference to the common law concept of 
curtilage. 
Concurrence: (Scalia) O 
 
Scalia coded as joining the majority. 
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Arizona v. Hicks (1987) 
480 U.S. 321 
Majority: (Scalia, Brennan, 






















Illinois v. Krull, (1987) 
480 U.S. 340 
Majority: (Blackmun, 






Dissent: (Marshall) NOBOMC 





Dissent: (O’Connor, Brennan, 
Marshall, Stevens) 
NOBOMC 
Mentioned that the original meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment included a prohibition on 
statutes that authorized unreasonable search and 
seizure, but the actual issue in the case was 
whether the exclusionary rule should be used as 
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O'Connor v. Ortega (1987)  
480 U.S. 709 
Plurality: (O’Connor, 
Rehnquist, White, Powell) 
NOBOMC 
Coded primary issue: whether the search of an 
employee’s office was reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
 
There is discussion of the Framing-era concern 
for places of work, however, the plurality 
employs a nonoriginalist balancing test to 
decide the case. 






Dissent: (Blackmun, Brennan. 
Marshall, Stevens) 
NOBOMC 
Coded primary issue: whether the search of an 
employee’s office was reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
 
There is discussion of the Framing-era concern 
for places of work, however, the dissent 







New York v. Burger (1987) 
482 U.S. 691 
Majority: (Blackmun, 
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Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987)  
483 U.S. 868 
Majority: (Scalia, Rehnquist, 




Dissent: (Blackmun, Marshall, 











California v. Greenwood (1988) 
486 U.S. 35 
(Sans Kennedy) 
Majority: (White, Rehnquist, 
Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, 
Scalia) 
NO Kennedy took no part in this opinion. 
Dissent: (Brennan, Marshall) O 
Dissent relies on Oliver v. U.S. and Boyd v. 
U.S., stating that "at common law, the curtilage 
is the area to which extends the intimate activity 
associated with the ‘sanctity of a man's home 
and the privacies of life.’” 
Michigan v. Chesternut (1988) 
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Murray v. United States (1988) 
487 U.S. 533 
(Sans Brennan and Kennedy) 
Majority: (Scalia, Rehnquist, 
White, Blackmun) 
NO 
Coded as majority; Brennan and Kennedy took 
no part in this opinion. 
Dissent: (Marshall, Stevens, 
O’Connor) 
NO  




Florida v. Riley (1989) 
488 U.S. 445 
Plurality: (White, Rehnquist, 
Scalia, Kennedy) 
O 
References the common-law concept of 
curtilage in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 
(1986). 
Concurrence: (O’Connor) O 
References the common-law concept of 
curtilage in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 
(1986). 










Brower v. County of Inyo (1989)  
489 U.S. 593 
Majority: (Scalia, Rehnquist, 
White, O’Connor, Kennedy 
O 
References the general warrants issued by Lord 
Halifax in the 1760's and writs of assistance. 
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Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association (1989) 
489 U.S. 602 
Majority: (Kennedy, Rehnquist, 
White, Blackmun, O’Connor, 















National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab (1989)  
489 U.S. 656 
Majority: (Kennedy, Rehnquist, 






Dissent: (Marshall, Brennan) NO 
 
 





United States v. Sokolow (1989)  
490 U.S. 1 
Majority: (Rehnquist, White, 
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Graham v. Connor (1989) 
490 U.S. 386 
Majority: (Rehnquist, White, 















James v. Illinois (1990) 
493 U.S. 307 
Majority: (Brennan, White, 














United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990) 
494 U.S. 259 
Majority: (Rehnquist, White, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy) 
O 
References the drafting history of the Fourth 
Amendment, along with the Federalist Papers. 
Concurrence: (Kennedy) O 
Kennedy coded as joining the majority. 
 







Dissent: (Brennan, Marshall) O 
References the drafting history of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
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Maryland v. Buie (1990)  
494 U.S. 325 
Majority: (White. Rehnquist, 
Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy) 
NO  












Florida v. Wells (1990)  
495 U.S. 1 
Majority: (Rehnquist, White, 





Concurrence: (Blackmun) NO 
 
 
Concurrence: (Stevens) NO 
 
 
New York v. Harris (1990) 
495 U.S. 14 
Majority: (White, Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy) 
NOBOMC 
References the overriding respect for the 
sanctity of the home that has been embedded in 
our traditions since the origins of the Republic 
cited in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 
(1980), but the actual issue in the case was 
whether the exclusionary rule should be used as 
a remedy in such case. 
Dissent: (Marshall, Brennan, 
Blackmun, Stevens) 
O 
Bases the dissent on the history of privacy and 
sanctity in one’s home, citing Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) and California v. 
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Minnesota v. Olson (1990) 
495 U.S. 91 
Majority: (White, Brennan, 














Dissent: (Rehnquist)  Vote not coded; dissented without opinion.  
Dissent: (Blackmun)  Vote not coded; dissented without opinion. 
Horton v. California (1990)  
496 U.S. 128 
Majority: (Stevens, Rehnquist, 










Alabama v. White (1990) 
496 U.S. 325 
Majority: (White, Rehnquist, 
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Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz (1990) 
496 U.S. 444 
Majority: (Rehnquist, White, 
















Dissent: (Stevens, Brennan 










Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 
497 U.S. 177 
Majority: (Scalia, Rehnquist, 
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California v. Hodari D. (1991)  
499 U.S. 621 
Majority: (Scalia, Rehnquist, 
White, Blackmun, O’Connor, 
Kennedy, Souter) 
O 
References the common-law understanding of 
the word “seizure.” 
Dissent: (Stevens, Marshall) NOBOMC 
Acknowledges the common-law understanding 
of “seizure,” but believes the Fourth 
Amendment is not rigidly confined by ancient 
common-law precept. 
City of Riverside v. McLaughlin (1991) 
500 U.S. 44 
Majority: (O’Connor, 
Rehnquist, White, Kennedy, 
Souter) 
NO 
Coded primary issue: whether the county's 
policy for providing post-arrest judicial 
determinations of probable cause complied with 
the Fourth Amendment. 
Dissent: (Marshall, Blackmun, 
Stevens) 
O Agreeing with Scalia dissent. 
Dissent: (Scalia) O 
Refers to the common-law traditions of arrest 
and prompt hearings.  
 
Endorsed a twenty-four-hour presumptive 
hearing requirement not based on original 
meaning. 
Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 
500 U.S. 248 
Majority: (Rehnquist, White, 
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California v. Acevedo (1991) 
500 U.S. 565 
Majority: (Blackmun, 
Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, 
Souter) 
NOBOMC 
References Carroll’s discussion of Framing-era 
law 
Concurrence: (Scalia) O 
Bases decision on the traditional common-law 
warrant requirement. 
 
Dissent: (White) NOBOMC 
Agreeing with most of Stevens’s dissent. 
 
Dissent: (Stevens, Marshall) NOBOMC 
Provides background on the Fourth Amendment 
explaining the Framers' direct constitutional 
response to the unreasonable law enforcement 
practices. 
Florida v. Bostick (1991) 
501 U.S. 429 
Majority: (O’Connor, 





















Soldal v. Cook County, Illinois (1992) 
506 U.S. 56 
Majority: (unanimous, White) NOBOMC 
References the history of sanctity in one’s 
home, citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 
(1980). 
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Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) 
508 U.S. 366 
Majority: (unanimous, White 





Majority: White [Parts III and 
IV], Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy, Souter) 
NO  
Concurrence: (Scalia) NOBOMC 
References the common-law view of stop and 
frisk to determine constitutionality of the frisk, 
but acknowledges that constitutionality of the 
“frisk” in the present case was neither 
challenged nor argued. 
Concurring in Part/Dissenting in 








Powell v. Nevada (1994)  
511 U.S. 79 
Majority: (Ginsburg, Blackmun, 
Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, 
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Arizona v. Evans (1995) 
514 U.S. 1 
Majority: (Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, 










Concurrence: (Souter, Breyer) NO 
 
 
Dissent: (Stevens) NOBOMC 
References the use of general warrants to search 
for evidence of violations of the Crown's 
revenue laws and how outraged the authors of 
the Bill of Rights were, but ultimately employs 
a cost-benefit analysis. 
Dissent: (Ginsburg, Stevens)  
Not coded because it did not discuss the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 
514 U.S. 927 
Majority: (unanimous, Thomas) O 
Bases decision on the common law knock-and-
announce principle. 
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (1995)  
515 U.S. 646 
Majority: (Scalia, Rehnquist, 
Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, 
Breyer) 
NOBOMC 
References the Framing-era rule that schools 
could exercise parental rights, but adds that 
because we now have compulsory attendance 
laws, that approach should not be used, and 
instead applies a nonoriginalist balancing test. 
Concurrence: (Ginsburg) NOBOMC Ginsburg coded as joining the majority opinion. 
Dissent: (O’Connor, Stevens, 
Souter) 
O 
Bases decision on historical evidence explaining 
why the Framers believed general warrants were 
“intolerable and unreasonable”. 
Whren v. United States (1996) 
517 U.S. 806 
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Ohio v. Robinette (1996) 
519 U.S. 33 
Majority: (Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, 
Souter, Thomas, Breyer) 
NO 
Coded primary issue: whether the Fourth 
Amendment requires that a lawfully seized 
defendant must be advised that he is “free to go” 
before his consent to search will be recognized 
as voluntary. 
Concurrence: (Ginsburg) NO  
Dissent: (Stevens) NO 
Coded primary issue: whether the Fourth 
Amendment requires that a lawfully seized 
defendant must be advised that he is “free to go” 
before his consent to search will be recognized 
as voluntary. 
Maryland v. Wilson (1997) 
519 U.S. 408 
Majority: (Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, 
Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer) 
NO  
Dissent: (Stevens, Kennedy) NO  
Dissent: (Kennedy) NO  
Chandler v. Miller (1997) 
520 U.S. 305 
Majority: (Ginsburg, Stevens, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, 
Souter, Thomas, Breyer) 
NO  






Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) 
520 U.S. 385 
Majority: (unanimous, Stevens) NOBOMC 
References the common-law knock-and-
announce principle and acknowledges that the 
common law believed individuals should be 
provided the opportunity to comply with the law 
and to avoid the destruction of property 
occasioned by a forcible entry, but dispenses 
with the requirement given the circumstances. 
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United States v. Ramirez (1998) 




Coded primary issue: whether the Fourth 
Amendment holds officers to a higher standard 
than reasonable suspicion when a “no-knock” 
entry results in the destruction of property. 
 
References the common law knock and 
announce principle, but bases its decision on the 
reasonableness of the officers’ actions. 
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott (1998) 
524 U.S. 357 
Majority: (Thomas, Rehnquist, 






Dissent: (Stevens) NO  





Minnesota v. Carter (1998) 
525 U.S. 83 
Majority: (Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas) 
NO  
Concurrence: (Scalia, Thomas) O 
Examines and bases decision on Founding-era 
materials for the understood meaning of “their 
…houses.” 
Concurrence: (Kennedy) NOBOMC 
References historical evidence and makes note 
that the interpretation of the English authorities 
that were the historical basis for the Fourth 
Amendment are disputed. 
Concurrence: (Breyer) NO  
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Knowles v. Iowa (1998) 








Wyoming v. Houghton (1999) 
526 U.S. 295 
Majority: (Scalia, Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, 
Breyer) 
O 
Cites to Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 
(1925) to show that, historically, warrantless 
searches of containers, within an automobile, 
are reasonable. 
Concurrence: (Breyer) O Breyer coded as joining the majority opinion. 






Florida v. White (1999) 
526 U.S. 559 
Majority: (Thomas, Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, 
Souter, Breyer) 
O 
Relies on the holding in Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), which mentions 
that warrantless searches of vessels, wagons, 
and carriages were historically viewed as 
reasonable. 
Concurrence: (Souter, Breyer) O 
Breyer and Souter coded as joining the majority 
opinion. 
Dissent: (Stevens, Ginsburg) NOBOMC  
Wilson v. Layne (1999) 
526 U.S. 603 
Majority: (unanimous, 
Rehnquist [Parts I and II]) 
O 
Bases decision on the centuries-old principle of 
respect for the privacy of the home and the 
common-law tradition of parties directly aiding 
in the execution of the warrant. 
Majority: (Rehnquist [Part III], 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, 
Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, 
Breyer) 
O 
Coded as agreeing with the majority on the 
Fourth Amendment issue. 
 
Concurring in Part, Dissenting in 
Part (Stevens) 
O 
Coded as agreeing with the majority on the 
Fourth Amendment issue. 
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Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 
528 U.S. 119 
Majority: (Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas) 
NO  
Concurring in Part, Dissenting in 
Part: (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, 
Breyer) 
NOBOMC 
Rejects Illinois's reliance on the common-law 
view that flight from an offense carries with it a 
strong presumption of guilt. 
Florida v. J.L. (2000) 













Bond v. United States (2000) 
529 U.S. 334 
Majority: (Rehnquist, Stevens, 
O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, 
Thomas, Ginsburg) 
NO  
Dissent: (Breyer, Scalia) NO 
 
 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) 
531 U.S. 32 
Majority: (O’Connor, Stevens, 
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, 
Breyer) 
NO  
Dissent: (Rehnquist, Thomas, 





Dissent: (Thomas) NOBOMC 
Makes mention that the Framers might not have 
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Illinois v. McArthur (2001) 
531 U.S. 326 
Majority: (Breyer, Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, 
Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg) 
NO  
Concurrence: (Souter) NO 
 
 
Dissent: (Stevens) NOBOMC 
References the centuries-old principle of respect 
for the privacy of the home, but actually applies 
the same nonoriginalist balancing test embraced 
by the Court. 
Ferguson v. City of Charleston (2001)  
532 U.S. 67 
Majority: (Stevens, O’Connor, 
Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer) 
NO  
Concurrence: (Kennedy) NO  
Dissent: (Scalia, Rehnquist [Part 
II], Thomas [Part II]) 
NO  
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001) 
532 U.S. 318 
Majority: (Souter, Rehnquist, 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas) 
O 
Coded primary issue: whether there is a breach 
of the peace requirement for warrantless 
misdemeanor arrests. 
Dissent: (O’Connor, Stevens, 
Ginsburg, Breyer) 
NOBOMC 
Notes that misdemeanor arrests were not the 
subject of a clear and consistently applied rule at 
common law. The dissent then employs a 
nonoriginalist balancing test.  
Kyllo v. United States (2001)  
533 U.S. 27 
Majority: (Scalia, Souter, 
Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer) 
O 
Believes the Fourth Amendment should 
preserve the privacy of the home recognized in 
the Framing-era. 
Dissent: (Stevens, Rehnquist, 
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United States v. Knights (2001) 




Concurrence: (Souter) NO 
 
 
United States v. Arvizu (2002) 







Concurrence: (Scalia) NO  
United States v. Drayton (2002) 
536 U.S. 194 
Majority: (Kennedy, Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, 
Breyer) 
NO  
Dissent: (Souter, Stevens, 
Ginsburg) 
NO  
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County et al v. Earls 
(2002) 
536 U.S. 822 
Majority: (Thomas, Rehnquist, 
Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer) 
NO  
Concurrence: (Breyer) NO 
Breyer joined the majority and wrote a 
concurring opinion. 
Dissent: (O’Connor, Souter) NO 
O’Connor and Souter joined both dissenting 
opinions. 
Dissent: (Ginsburg, Stevens, 
O’Connor, Souter) 
NO  
United States v. Banks (2003) 
540 U.S. 31 
Majority: (Unanimous, Scalia) 
NBMOC 
Refers to common-law knock-and-announce 
rule from Wilson v. Arkansas. 
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Maryland v. Pringle (2003) 







Illinois v. Lidster (2004) 
540 U.S. 419 
Majority: (Breyer, Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas) 
Parts I and II: (Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg) 
NO 
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined the 
majority for Parts I and II, but together shared a 
partial concurrence/dissent to the judgment. 
Partial Concurrence/Dissent: 






Groh v. Ramirez (2004) 
540 U.S. 551 
Majority: (Stevens, O’Conner, 
Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer) 
NO  





Dissent: (Thomas, Scalia) 
Part III: (Rehnquist) 
NOBOMC 
Rehnquist joins Thomas dissent in 
nonoriginalist Part III. 
United States v. Flores-Montano (2004) 
541 U.S. 149 
Majority: (Unanimous, 
Rehnquist) 
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Thornton v. United States (2004) 
541 U.S. 615 
Majority: (Rehnquist, Kennedy, 
Thomas, Breyer) 
Sans Footnote 4: (O’Connor) 
NO 
O’Connor joined the majority for all but 
footnote 4. 
Concurrence: (O’Connor) NO  










Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District (2004) 
542 U.S. 177 
Majority: (Kennedy, Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas) NOBOMC  
Dissent: (Stevens) Not coded Only addresses Fifth Amendment issue. 








Devenpeck v. Alford (2004) 
543 U.S. 146 
(Sans Rehnquist) 
Majority: (Unanimous, Scalia) NO Rehnquist took no part in this opinion. 
Illinois v. Caballes (2004) 
543 U.S. 405 
(Sans Rehnquist) 
Majority: (Stevens, O’Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, 
Breyer) 
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Muehler v. Mena (2005) 
544 U.S. 93 
Majority: (Rehnquist, 
































United States v. Grubbs (2006) 
547 U.S. 90 
(Sans Alito) 
Majority: (Scalia, Roberts, 
Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg) 
NO 
Alito took no part in this opinion.  
 
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter joined as to Parts 
I and II, but filed a separate concurrence. 
Concurrence: (Souter, Stevens, 
Ginsburg) 
NOBOMC 
Cites to “the objectionable 18th century writs of 
assistance” (Pp. 100) and equates the “start 
date” of warrants as an established principle. 
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Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 
547 U.S. 103 
(Sans Alito) 
Majority: (Souter, Stevens, 
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer) 
NOBOMC 
Alito took no part in this opinion. 
 
Cites to “ancient adage that a man’s house is his 
castle.”   
Concurrence: (Stevens) NOBOMC 
Begins concurrence with a statement regarding 
the necessity of considering historical evidence 
and how it relates to our changing society, but 
ultimately relies on the changes in society for 
the reasoning behind the concurrence.  
Concurrence: (Breyer) NO 
 
 















Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart (2006) 
547 U.S. 398 
Majority: (Roberts, Scalia, 
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, 
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Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 
547 U.S. 586 
Majority: 
Parts I-III: (Scalia, Roberts, 
Kennedy, Thomas, Alito) 
Part IV: (Scalia, Roberts, 
Thomas, Alito) 
NOBOMC 
Identifies “common law principle” of knock-
and-announce as “ancient,” tracing its origin to 
English law. 
Concurrence: (Kennedy) NOBOMC 
First part of Kennedy’s concurrence discusses 
the privacy protection represented by knock-
and-announce as “explained in our decisions 
and as understood since the beginnings of the 
Republic.” Consistently refers to knock-and-
announce as an “ancient” principle. 
Dissent: (Breyer, Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg) 
NOBOMC 
Makes reference to “tracing the lineage of the 
knock-and-announce rule” which dates “back to 
the 13th century.” Dissent further elaborates on 
the intent of the Framers of the Constitution and 





Samson v. California (2006) 
547 U.S. 843 
Majority: (Thomas, Roberts, 







Dissent: (Stevens, Souter, 
Breyer) 
O 
The dissent cites to the “pre-Revolutionary 
‘writs of innocence’” of arbitrary contraband 
searches and eventually cites to individualized 
suspicion as “the shield the Framers selected to 
guard against the evils of arbitrary action, 
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Scott v. Harris (2007) 
550 U.S. 372 
Majority: (Scalia, Roberts, 
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito) 
NO  
Concurrence: (Ginsburg) NO  
Concurrence: (Breyer) NO  
Dissent: (Stevens) NO  
Brendlin v. California (2007) 
551 U.S. 249 
Majority: (Souter, Roberts, 
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Thomas, 
Breyer, Alito, Scalia, Stevens) 
NOBOMC 
The Court cites to Brower v. County of Inyo, a 
case coded as originalist, stating that the test for 
a seizure is found within this case. 
Virginia v. Moore (2008) 
553 U.S. 164 
Majority: (Scalia, Roberts, 
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, 
Thomas, Breyer, Alito) 
NOBOMC 
The Court “begins with history” in its analysis 
of whether a search or seizure is unreasonable.  
“When history has not provided a conclusive 
answer,” the Court states, governmental 
interests and privacy interests are weighed. Id. 
at 171. This is ultimately the test used by the 
Court for the facts of the case. 
Concurrence: (Ginsburg) NOBOMC 
Ginsburg cites to the common law and 
“historical record” but ultimately rests opinion 
on belief that the arrest violated Virginia law, 
but not the Constitution. 
Herring v. United States (2009) 
555 U.S. 135 
Majority: (Roberts, Scalia, 






Dissent: (Ginsburg, Stevens, 
Souter, Breyer) 
NOBOMC 
Breyer joined opinion pp. 704-710 
Equates failure to maintain a database as akin to 
“the use of general warrants that so outraged the 
authors of our Bill of Rights.” (Pp. 156) 
Dissent: (Breyer, Souter) NOBOMC Souter joined pp. 710-711 
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Arizona v. Johnson (2009) 
555 U.S. 323 
Majority: (Ginsburg, Alito, 
Breyer, Kennedy, Roberts, 
Scalia, Souter, Stevens, Thomas) 
NO 
Unanimous Ginsburg opinion. 
 
Arizona v. Gant (2009) 
556 U.S. 332 
Majority: (Stevens, Scalia, 
Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg) 
NO 
Entire case calls into question the rules of 
Belton, Thornton, and Chimel. 
Concurrence: (Scalia) NOBOMC Finds historical evidence inconclusive 
Dissent: (Breyer) NO  
Dissent: (Alito, Roberts, 
Kennedy, Breyer) 
NO 
Breyer joined except Part II-E; Alito’s dissent 
makes brief reference to Scalia’s concurrence in 
Thornton, which is coded NOBOMC. 
Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding (2009) 
557 U.S. 364 
Majority: (Souter, Roberts, 
Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, Alito) 
 









Thomas cites to common law doctrine of in loco 
parentis.  
City of Ontario v. Quon (2010) 
560 U.S. 746 
Majority: (Kennedy, Roberts, 
Stevens, Thomas, Ginsburg, 
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Kentucky v. King (2011) 
563 U.S. 452 
Majority: (Alito, Roberts, Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, 
Sotomayor, Kagan) 
NO  
Dissent: (Ginsburg) NO  
Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd (2011) 
563 U.S. 731 
Majority: (Scalia, Roberts, 
Kennedy, Thomas, Alito) 
NOBOMC 
Kagan took no part in this opinion. 
 
Cites to the “historical assertions” of the Court 
of Appeals, stating that “[t]he Fourth 
Amendment was a response to the English 
Crown’s use of general warrants, which often 
allowed royal officials to search and seize 
whatever and whomever they pleased while 
investigating crimes or affronts to the Crown.” 
The Court later states, “The principal evil of the 
general warrant was addressed by the Fourth 
Amendment’s particularity requirement.” 
Concurrence: (Kennedy, 










Davis v. United States (2011) 
564 U.S. 229 
Majority: (Alito, Roberts, Scalia, 







Concurrence: (Sotomayor) NO 
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United States v. Jones (2012) 
565 U.S. 400 
Majority: (Scalia, Roberts, 
Kennedy, Thomas, Sotomayor) 
O 
The Court concludes its opinion with, “We have 
no doubt that such a physical intrusion would 
have been considered a ‘search’ within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was 
adopted.” 
Concurrence: (Sotomayor) O  
Concurrence: (Alito, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Kagan) 
NOBOMC 
Alito discusses the Court’s use of “18th-century 
tort law” relating to trespass to chattels and later 
says that “it is almost impossible to think of 
late-18th century situations that are analogous to 
what took place in this case.”  
 
Alito acknowledges the importance of 
considering the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment at its inception, but does not think 
it entirely representative of the violation in this 
case. 
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington (2012) 
566 U.S. 318 
Majority: (Kennedy, Roberts, 
Scalia, Alito, Thomas) 
NO 
Kennedy wrote all but Part IV.  
Roberts, Scalia, Alito joined in full.  
Thomas joined all but Part IV. 
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Bailey v. United States (2013) 
568 U.S. 186 
Majority: (Kennedy, Roberts, 
Scalia, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, 
Kagan) 
NOBOMC 
Court applies the “immediate vicinity” rule of 
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 and 
determines that it does not apply to the facts of 
this case. 
 





Concurrence: (Scalia, Ginsburg, 
Kagan) 
NOBOMC 
P. 1044 quotes Dunaway v. New York regarding 
the concept that the Fourth Amendment 
“protections intended by the Framers could all 
too easily disappear in the consideration and 
balancing of the multifarious circumstances 
presented by different causes.” 









Florida v. Harris (2013) 
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Florida v. Jardines (2013) 
569 U.S. 1 
Majority: (Scalia, Thomas, 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan) 
O 
Section II makes reference to the Amendment’s 
“simple baseline” of protection covering the 
government’s physical intrusion onto private 
property. 
 
Section II-A, states that curtilage (specifically 
open fields) are excluded from Fourth 
Amendment protection “because such fields are 
not enumerated in the Amendment’s text.” 
 
Ultimately, because the government physically 
entered Jardines’ home and the surrounding 
area, their activity constituted a search. 






Dissent: (Alito, Roberts, 
Kennedy, Breyer) 
NOBOMC 
Makes repeated references to domestication of 
dogs being a centuries-old concept and that the 
use of dogs for investigative purposes is old 
enough to have been considered by the Framers, 
but it was not included. 
Missouri v. McNeely (2013) 
569 U.S. 141 
Majority: (Sotomayor) 
Parts I, II-A, II-B, and IV: 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, 
Kagan) 
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Maryland v. King (2013) 
569 U.S. 435 
Majority: (Kennedy, Roberts, 
Thomas, Breyer, Alito) 
NOBOMC 
Part IV-A states, “Also uncontested is the ‘right 
on the part of the Government, always 
recognized under English and American law, to 
search the person of the accused when legally 
arrested … ‘The validity of the search of a 
person incident to a lawful arrest has been 
regarded as settled from the first enunciation, 
and has remained virtually unchallenged.” 
Dissent: (Scalia, Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, Kagan) 
NOBOMC 
Part I-A states, “At the time of the Founding, 
Americans despised the British use of so-called 
‘general warrants’—warrants not grounded 
upon a sworn oath of a specific infraction by a 
particular individual, and thus not limited in 
scope and application.”  
Paragraph continues to cite other evidence 
relating to the concept of general warrants. 
Ultimately, the intrusion on the person as an 
explicit violation of the Fourth Amendment is 
the reasoning behind this opinion. 
Fernandez v. California (2014) 
571 U.S. 292 
Majority: (Alito, Roberts, Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer) NO 
 
 
Concurrence: (Scalia) O 
Cites to the “traditional property-based 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment” 
(quoting United States v. Jones) and uses it to 





Dissent: (Ginsburg, Sotomayor, 
Kagan) 
NOBOMC 
P. 317 discusses the neutral magistrate’s role in 
warrant distribution; “Because the Framers saw 
the neutral magistrate as shielding all of us, 
good or bad, saint or sinner, from unchecked 
police activity. . . .” and later says: “‘But the 
Fourth Amendment’ the Court has long 
recognized, ‘reflects the view of those who 
wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a 
person’s home and property may not be totally 
sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in 
enforcement of criminal law.” 
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Navarette v. California (2014) 
572 U.S. 393 
Majority: (Thomas, Roberts, 
Kennedy, Breyer, Alito)  
NO  
Dissent: (Scalia, Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, Kagan)  
NOBOMC 
In regard to anonymous calls becoming 
legitimate tips as long as the caller can identify 
his location, Scalia says, “This is not my 
concept, and I am sure would not be the 
Framers’, of a people secure from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.” (P. 405). 
Plumhoff v. Rickard (2014) 
134 S. Ct. 2012 
Majority: (Alito, Roberts, Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, Sotomayor, 
Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer) 
NO 
Ginsburg joined as to Parts I, II, and III-C.  
Breyer joined all except Part III-B-2. 
Riley v. California (2014) 
134 S. Ct. 2473 
Majority: (Roberts, Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan) 
NOBOMC 
Discusses technological advancement re: cell 
phone use and concept of adopting procedures 
for law enforcement. The Court says of these 
protocols, “Probably a good idea, but the 
Founders did not fight a revolution to gain the 
right to government agency protocols.” (P. 
2491) 
 
Opinion also discusses the general warrants and 
writs of assistance of the colonial era and 
considers them as an analogy to the proposed 
compulsory procedures of forcing a citizen to 
surrender his phone and/or the information 
contained within it. 
 
Ultimately, the Court decides that the privacy 
interest in a cell phone was greater than a 
Founding-era argument.  
Concurrence: (Alito) NOBOMC 
Cites to the “well-established . . . mid-
eighteenth century” principle of search incident 
to arrest. Footnote on P. 2496 makes reference 
to searches of a person in the colonial era 
including “not only his surface clothing but his 
body, luggage, and saddlebags.” 
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Heien v. North Carolina (2014) 
135 S. Ct. 530 
Majority: (Roberts, Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Alito, Kagan) 
NO  
Concurrence: (Kagan, Ginsburg) NO 
 
 
Dissent: (Sotomayor) NO 
 
 
Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 
135 S. Ct. 1609 
Majority: (Ginsburg, Roberts, 
Scalia, Breyer, Sotomayor, 
Kagan) 
NO  




Dissent: (Thomas, Alito, 
Kennedy) 
NOBOMC 
Kennedy joined all but Part III. 
 
Part I states:  
We have defied reasonableness “in objective 
terms by examining the totality of the 
circumstances,” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 
39 (1996), and by considering “the traditional 
protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures afforded by the common law at the time 
of the framing,” Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 
318, 326 (2001) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). When traditional protections have not 
provided a definitive answer, our precedents 
have “analyzed a search or seizure in light of 
traditional standards of reasonableness by 
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which 
it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on 
the other, the degree to which it is needed for 
the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.” Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 
(2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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City of Los Angeles v. Patel (2015) 
135 S. Ct. 2443 
Majority: (Sotomayor, Kennedy, 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan) 
NOBOMC 
Cites to “An Act For The Due Regulation Of 
Licensed Houses (1786)” which raises the point 
that hotels have been historically treated as 
public accommodations. 
Dissent: (Scalia, Roberts, 
Thomas) 
NOBOMC 
Part II discusses textual interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment.  
 
Part II-A elaborates on the majority’s point re: 
hotels as public accommodations and cites to 
Blackstone’s “Commentaries on the Laws of 
England 168 (1765). 
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